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Antitrust Policy Toward Patent Licensing: 
Why Negotiation Matters 
Daniel F. Spulber* 
ABSTRACT 
Major technological changes driving the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution combine complementary inventions to form complex 
innovations. These include the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G mo-
bile communications, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud compu-
ting, data analytics, autonomous vehicles, additive manufactur-
ing, and augmented/virtual reality. This article shows that 
negotiation of patent license contracts fully eliminates many in-
fluential antitrust concerns about complementary inventions, in-
cluding “royalty stacking,” “SEP hold-up,” “patent thickets,” 
“blocking patents,” the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons,” and “reg-
ulatory patent pools.” Negotiation of patent license contracts im-
plies that total royalties will be less than those charged by a bun-
dling monopoly. Negotiation of patent license contracts in a 
competitive market avoids distortions from royalties per unit of 
output and eliminates the multiple-marginalization problem. Ne-
gotiation generates contract provisions consistent with contingent 
royalty arrangements. Negotiation also has important implica-
tions for antitrust policy toward patent pools. The analysis shows 
that patent pools serve to mitigate transaction costs rather than 
to regulate total royalties. This article suggests that antitrust pol-
icy makers should continue to be neutral between negotiation of 
patent license contracts and patent pools. This article supports 
the view that negotiation is pro-competitive as expressed by the 
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2017 United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technological change increasingly depends on complex in-
novations that combine many complementary inventions.1 Tech-
nological advances based on complex innovations include the In-
ternet of Things (IoT), 5G mobile communications, artificial 
intelligence (AI), cloud computing, data analytics, autonomous 
vehicles, additive manufacturing, and augmented/virtual real-
ity.2 These significant technological advances have been de-
scribed as the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR).3 This article 
considers antitrust policy toward patent licensing when there 
are complementary inventions and shows why negotiation of pa-
tent license agreements is fundamental for formulating anti-
trust policy. 
The growing importance of complementary inventions and 
complex innovations has raised a number of antitrust concerns.4 
Various policy makers question whether patent licensing in a 
competitive market achieves economic efficiency.5 Some express 
 
 1. See Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. 
PHIL. SOC’Y. 467, 468 (1962) (“Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made 
up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way. In such systems, 
the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical 
sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the 
parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the 
properties of the whole.”). 
 2. See generally EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, PATENTS AND THE FOURTH 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE INVENTIONS BEHIND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 
(2017) (providing a broad discussion on these and related topics). 
 3. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means and 
How to Respond, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.foreignaf-
fairs.com/articles/2015-12-12/fourth-industrial-revolution; KLAUS SCHWAB, 
THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1, 7 (2017). 
 4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7 (2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_state-
ments/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES] 
(“While intellectual property licensing arrangements are typically welfare-en-
hancing and procompetitive, antitrust concerns may nonetheless arise.”). 
 5. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING 
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 5, 22 (2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-market-
place-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-
trade/110307patentreport.pdf (discussing the effects on competition of patent 
notice and remedies); see also Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. 
Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Co-
ordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 5–6 (2012) (discussing policy con-
cerns about patent license markets). 
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concerns that complementary inventions could increase total pa-
tent license royalties and discourage innovation, often without 
empirical support.6 Policy discussions also raise the issue of in-
creased costs of coordination between patent holders and tech-
nology implementers.7 Some policy analysts and researchers ask 
whether market institutions such as standards organizations 
are pro-competitive.8 This article addresses these antitrust con-
cerns and shows that market negotiation of patent licenses pro-
motes competition and protects consumer welfare. 
Practically all patent license agreements form through mar-
ket negotiation, with the exception of licenses offered by patent 
pools. The present discussion develops a framework that exam-
ines market negotiation of patent license contracts with comple-
mentary inventions. The analysis shows that market negotiation 
between patent holders and technology implementers achieves 
economic efficiency with complementary inventions. The present 
study finds that market negotiation between technology provid-
ers and technology implementers promotes innovation and is 
pro-competitive. 
The main insight is that negotiation in a competitive market 
generates total royalties that are strictly less than those of a 
bundled monopoly patent holder. Negotiation between patent 
holders and technology implementers avoids distortionary roy-
alties from running royalties that are constant per unit of output 
and solves the multiple-marginalization problem. Royalties are 
contingent on prices in the product market, which accords with 
most observed royalty arrangements such as shares of sales 
 
 6. See Kirti Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 827, 857 (2013) (“The empirical basis for some of the 
specific concerns raised, however, is decidedly mixed.”). 
 7. See id. at 844–45 (noting that technology implementers need to reach 
“multiple independent licensing negotiations,” which results in increased costs 
and lower margins); see also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdevel-
oped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2007) (discussing ways 
that patent holders lack sufficient incentives to fully utilize their IP); Ted 
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2009) (same). 
 8. Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploi-
tative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the 
Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 128–29 (2007) (“[W]hile the 
theoretical literature is fairly rich, the empirical literature testing the validity 
of the royalty stacking and anti-commons theories in the real world is sparse 
and often not very rigorous.”); see also Jay P. Choi, Standardization and Exper-
imentation: Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Standardization, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 273 
(1996) (analyzing when standardization yields optimal results). 
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revenues, lump-sum fees based on prices, profit shares, equity 
shares, options, milestones, cross-licensing, alliances, joint-ven-
ture agreements, and bundling of goods and services with intel-
lectual property (IP). With competition, both the upstream mar-
ket for patent license contracts and the downstream product 
market will be efficient. This, in turn, provides incentives for ef-
ficiency in invention, innovation, and standardization. 
These conclusions have useful implications for antitrust pol-
icy toward patent licensing. The present analysis supports the 
joint position of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and Na-
tional Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) regarding 
the importance of negotiation for efficiency and patent licens-
ing.9 This joint Policy Statement points out that negotiation pro-
motes efficiency for patent licensing generally and for licensing 
standard essential patents (SEPs) subject to Fair, Reasonable, 
and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Commitments.10 The present 
analysis also supports a key principle set forth by the DOJ Anti-
trust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Anti-
trust Guidelines: “intellectual property licensing allows firms to 
combine complementary factors of production and is generally 
procompetitive.”11 
Patent licensing with complementary inventions has raised 
four types of antitrust policy concerns that this article argues 
are misguided. These antitrust issues are as follows: (1) patent 
holders generate “royalty stacking” by choosing royalties that ex-
ceed what a bundling monopoly patent holder would charge; (2) 
patent holders engage in “SEP hold-up” by raising royalties to 
 
 9. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & Nat’l Inst. of 
Standards and Tech., Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential 
Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (2019), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SEP%20policy%20state-
ment%20signed.pdf [hereinafter Policy Statement]. 
 10. Id. at 5 (“[G]ood faith in negotiations involving F/RAND commit-
ments, supported by availability of data and application of best practices, can 
promote licensing efficiency, just as it can in negotiations involving commit-
ments for patents that are not essential to standards.”). 
 11. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 2. 
Additionally, the Agencies state: “(a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the 
Agencies apply the same analysis to conduct involving intellectual property as 
to conduct involving other forms of property, taking into account the specific 
characteristics of a particular property right; (b) the Agencies do not presume 
that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context . . . .” 
Id. 
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take advantage of adopters conforming to technology standards; 
(3) patent holders build “patent thickets,” have “blocking pa-
tents,” and cause the related “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” be-
cause licensing complementary inventions creates coordination 
problems for adopters; and (4) to address these alleged problems, 
antitrust authorities should encourage patent holders to form 
what this article will term “regulatory patent pools” that address 
various public policy objectives. 
These four misguided antitrust policy concerns are based on 
erroneous economic reasoning and inaccurate descriptions of 
markets and institutions. Despite this, these four antitrust con-
cerns have been influential in agency policies and legal cases. 
“Royalty stacking” appears in antitrust agency reports12 and 
prominent legal cases such as Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Erics-
son v. D-Link, and Unwired Planet v. Huawei.13 SEP and patent 
“hold-up” are cited in antitrust agency reports14 and a large 
number of legal cases,15 including Ericsson v. D-Link, Huawei v. 
ZTE, and Unwired Planet v. Huawei.16 “Patent thickets” are dis-
cussed in various antitrust agency reports17 and addressed by 
the Affordable Prescriptions for Patients (APP) Act proposed to 
the Senate in 2019 by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Richard 
 
 12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITION 8, 61 (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/
P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf. 
 13. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 
F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. 
[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat). 
 14. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, 
at 8, 35 n.11; Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Pa-




 15. From 2007 to 2018 about 140 U.S. legal cases involving SEPs mention 
patent “hold-up.” See J. Gregory Sidak, Is Patent Holdup a Hoax?, 3 CRITERION 
J. ON INNOVATION 401, 476–77 fig.3 (2018). 
 16. Ericsson, Inc., 773 F.3d 1201; Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. 
v. ZTE Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391 (November 20, 2014); Unwired Planet Int’l 
Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat). 
 17. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6 (2003), 
http://ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter 2003 FTC IP Report]; 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 14, at 56. 
2020] ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD PATENT LICENSING 89 
 
Blumenthal (D-CT).18 The World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO) in an antitrust report states that “two mutually 
blocking patents are complementary from a legal point of 
view.”19 “Blocking patents” are considered in various cases such 
as Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc., de-
cided in 2018.20 
Finally, advocates urge antitrust policy makers to push for 
“regulatory patent pools” as a means of achieving public policy 
objectives.21 The argument is that “regulatory patent pools” de-
crease royalties in comparison to the market for patent license 
agreements.22 A USPTO report suggested biotechnology patent 
pools as solutions to “royalty stacking” and “blocking patents.”23 
 
 18. Cornyn, Blumenthal Introduce Bill to Prevent Drug Companies from 
Abusing Patent System, CORNYN.SENATE.GOV (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/content/news/cornyn-blumenthal-introduce-
bill-prevent-drug-companies-abusing-patent-system (“To help prevent drug 
companies from deliberately abusing the patent system, the Affordable Pre-
scriptions for Patients Act would codify definitions of product hopping and pa-
tent thicketing within the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.”); Susannah 
Luthi & Sarah Owermohle, ‘Patent Thicket’ Bill Caught in Tug-of-War over 
Drug Pricing Reforms, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.polit-
ico.com/news/2019/10/25/patent-thicket-bill-caught-in-tug-of-war-over-drug-
pricing-reforms-056858; Steve Brachmann, Affordable Prescriptions for Pa-
tients Act Would Allow FTC to Prosecute Pharma Patent Thickets, Product Hop-
ping, IPWATCHDOG (May 20, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/20/af-
fordable-prescriptions-patients-act-allow-ftc-prosecute-pharmaceutical-patent-
thickets-product-hopping/id=109384/. 
 19. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST—A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 4 (2014); see also Communication from the Commis-
sion, Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2014 O.J. (C 
89) 10–11. 
 20. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018); see also Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir. 
2013); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
 21. See Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Pa-
tent Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (“I . . . propose policies that will pro-
mote the formation of beneficial patent pools . . . .”); Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing 
FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 47, 54 (2013) (promoting the use of a “pseudo-pool” approach and 
noting that “relatively few standards have utilized pools, most likely because 
they require high startup costs and extensive planning.”). 
 22. See id., at 4 (noting that patent pools have the potential to “lower[] total 
royalties relative to independent licensing”). 
 23. JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT 
POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 
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The U.S. Antitrust Guidelines identify integrating complemen-
tary technologies and clearing blocking positions among the ben-
efits of patent pools but generally focus on preventing anticom-
petitive effects of patent pools.24 The European Union (EU), 
however, suggests both encouragement and the potential for reg-
ulation of complementary patent pools: “Measures to encourage 
the setting up of pools for key standardi[z]ed technologies should 
be encouraged, e.g. facilitating access to pool management offers 
and technical assistance by SDO [(standard developing organi-
zation)]. The European Commission will consider further 
measures if these efforts are ineffective in IoT sectors.”25 
The four misguided antitrust concerns appear to be very dif-
ferent at first, but they are all branches from the same tree. The 
common source is an economic model that is nearly two hundred 
years old.26 The Cournot complementary monopolies model (the 
“Cournot model”) makes a prediction known as the “Cournot Ef-
fect.”27 The “Cournot Effect” prediction is that total royalties 
with complementary inventions will be even greater than what 
a monopoly inventor would offer for a bundle of those inven-
tions.28 In short, the “Cournot Effect” involves price distortions 
worse than with a bundled monopoly.29 
Many academic studies apply the Cournot model to the de-
sign of public policy toward patent licensing. The Cournot model 
and its prediction of the “Cournot Effect” are the economic basis 
 
8 (2000) (“A first benefit associated with the pooling of patents is the elimination 
of problems caused by ‘blocking’ patents or ‘stacking’ licenses.”). 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 30. 
 25. Setting Out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents, at 8, COM 
(2017) 712 final (Nov. 29, 2017); see also Communication from the Commission, 
supra note 19, at 45 (“Technology pools can produce pro-competitive effects, in 
particular by reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumulative 
royalties to avoid double marginali[z]ation.”). 
 26. AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCI-
PLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH, (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., The Macmillan 
Company 1897) (1838). The Cournot complementary monopolies model is based 
on Cournot’s output competition model in the same book; it simply relabels out-
puts as prices. 
 27. See Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents with 
FRAND Commitments: Preparing for 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 79, 138 (2020). 
 28. See id. (“Cournot’s theoretical analysis shows that monopolists supply-
ing complementary inputs to competitive downstream producers will choose 
prices whose total is greater than what a monopolist would charge for a bundle 
of those inputs. This inefficiency is known as the ‘Cournot Effect.’”). 
 29. See id. 
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for “royalty stacking,”30 “SEP hold-up,”31 “patent thickets,”32 
“blocking patents,”33 and the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons.”34 
Various studies apply the Cournot model and the “Cournot Ef-
fect” to argue that patent pools would choose lower total royal-
ties in comparison to market negotiation of patent license agree-
ments.35 Some studies recommend that antitrust authorities 
 
 30. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stack-
ing, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013 (2007); Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, 
Innovation Specialists and Competition Policy, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 526, 530 
(2009); Yann Meniere & Sarah Parlane, Decentralized Licensing of Complemen-
tary Patents: Comparing the Royalty, Fixed-Fee and Two-Part Tariff Regimes, 
22 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 178, 178 (2010); Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Royalty 
Stacking, and Collective Action, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2015, at 2–3; 
Gastón Llanes & Joaquín Poblete, Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and 
Patent-Pool Formation, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 50, 51 (2014). 
 31. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J., 603, 641–42 (2007); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Es-
sential Patents, 123 J. POL. ECON. 547, 574 (2015); A. Douglas Melamed & Carl 
Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effec-
tive, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2138–39 (2017). A study of land sales obtains the 
“Cournot Effect” without citing Cournot’s model. See Wolfgang Eckart, On the 
Land Assembly Problem, 18 J. URB. ECON. 364, 371 (1985) (“[C]omplementarity 
of the traded goods reverses the conclusions drawn from standard oligopoly the-
ory: collusion turns out to be socially desirable in so far as it favors both sides 
of the market.”). 
 32. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL. & ECON. 119, 122–24 (Adam 
B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent 
Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 872 (2007) (“[P]atent thickets present a classic 
complements problem.”). 
 33. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 391, 396–97 (2003); Jay Pil Choi, Patent Pools and Cross‐Licensing in the 
Shadow of Patent Litigation, 51 INT’L ECON. REV. 441, 447–48 (2010). 
 34. See James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons 
and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5–10 (2000) (presenting a geometric-al-
gebraic model that shows the non-realized economic value inherent in the anti-
commons problem is analogous to the “Cournot Effect”); Paul A. David, Mitigat-
ing “Anticommons” Harms to Science and Technology Research, 2 WIPO J. 59, 
62 (2010). 
 35. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 134 (“In many respects, a patent 
pool . . . is the purest solution to the complements problem . . . .”); Richard J. 
Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3; Gilbert, supra note 21, at 21–22. C.f. Atsushi Kato, Patent Pool 
Enhances Market Competition, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 255, 266 (2004) (argu-
ing that a patent pool of substitute patents may raise social welfare, presenting 
a slight variation on the “Cournot Effect”); Sung-Hwan Kim, Vertical Structure 
and Patent Pools, 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 231, 248 (2004) (applying the “Cournot 
model” to the analysis of the interaction between vertically integrated firms and 
patent pools to conclude it leads to the reductions of double marginalization and 
lowers incentive to raise rivals’ costs); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Public Policy 
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promote “regulatory patent pools” as a means of controlling pa-
tent license royalties and imposing arbitrary technology bench-
marks.36 Gilbert states that “antitrust authorities and the courts 
should encourage policies that promote the formation and dura-
bility of beneficial pools that combine complementary pa-
tents . . . .”37 Contreras calls for the formation of pseudo patent 
pools that would choose patent royalties before technology 
standards are established.38 
This article shows that the “Cournot Effect” should not be 
used as a basis for antitrust policy toward patent licensing. The 
Cournot model makes several unrealistic and extreme assump-
tions about markets and institutions. These assumptions are 
highly misleading in the context of patent licensing. The Cournot 
model assumes that patent holders set license royalties through 
 
Toward Patent Pools, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 157, 177 (2007); Steffen 
Brenner, Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools, 40 ECON. THEORY 373, 374 
(2009); Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel, Pools and the Dynamic R&D In-
centives, 36 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 66 (2013) (showing patent pools stimulate 
research and development and accelerate the rate at which essential technolo-
gies reach market and benefit consumers); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient 
Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 706 (2004) (arguing that patent pools in-
crease welfare if patents are complimentary); Choi, supra note 33, at 447; 
Llanes & Poblete, supra note 30, at 63 (finding that patent pools formed after a 
standard is chosen may negatively impact welfare even when complimentary); 
Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, Patent Policy, Patent Pools and the Accumu-
lation of Claims, 50 ECON. THEORY 703, 706 (2012) (explaining that pools of 
complementary patents increase welfare with “endogenous innovation”); Klaus 
Schmidt, Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools 
(GESY, Working Paper No. 342, 2010), http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/me-
dia/342.pdf (“[P]atent pools can play an important role in lowering royalties, 
reducing transaction costs, disseminating new technologies, and fostering inno-
vation incentives.”); Klaus Schmidt, Complementary Patents and Market Struc-
ture, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 68, 70 (2014) (“We conclude that the cur-
rent shift in U.S. competition policy to permit patent pools for complementary 
patents is a move in the right direction.”). 
 36. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 123 (“This basic theory of complements 
(used in fixed proportions) gives strong support for businesses to adopt, and for 
competition authorities to welcome, either cross licensees, package licenses, or 
patent pools to clear such blocking positions.”); Gilbert, supra note 21, at 45. 
C.f. Contreras, supra note 21, at 94 (“This proposal calls for the encouragement 
of joint ex ante negotiation of royalty rates prior to lock-in of a standard, conduct 
that has been viewed favorably by several regulatory agencies and acknowl-
edged as offering various procompetitive benefits.”). 
 37. Gilbert, supra note 21, at 45. 
 38. Contreras, supra note 21, at 63. 
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“take-it-or-leave-it” pricing.39 The Cournot model assumes that 
royalties are constant per unit of output, ruling out lump-sum 
payments and various contingent arrangements.40 The Cournot 
model assumes that the product market has 100% cost pass-
through because it assumes that market supply is infinitely elas-
tic.41 The Cournot model further assumes that patent holders 
have 100% market power in the market for patent licenses and 
in the downstream product market.42 This combination of im-
plausible assumptions generates the “Cournot Effect.”43 
The present analysis shows that negotiation in a competi-
tive market eliminates, and indeed reverses, the “Cournot Ef-
fect.” Market negotiation of patent license agreements removes 
the basis for “royalty stacking,” “SEP hold-up,” “patent thickets,” 
and the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons.” Market negotiation of 
patent licenses also obviates the need for antitrust authorities to 
promote “regulatory patent pools” as a means of solving these 
alleged antitrust problems. The market negotiation framework 
presented here holds generally for any cost pass-through of less 
than 100% and for any patent holder bargaining power of less 
than 100%. The predictions of the market negotiation framework 
conform much more closely to observed market outcomes than 
the Cournot model. 
Antitrust policy concerns based on the “Cournot Effect” are 
misguided because the underlying economic analysis does not 
apply to markets for patent licensing. In addition, the predicted 
“Cournot Effect” offers highly inaccurate descriptions of the mar-
ket for patent licenses. Antitrust policy should be based on eco-
nomic models that are consistent with market institutions and 
reflect empirical analysis of market conditions. Antitrust policy 
 
 39. See Spulber, supra note 27, at 138 (“The theoretical ‘Cournot Effect’ is 
the result of assuming that complementary monopolists offer take-it-or-leave-it 
prices to producers.”). 
 40. See Daniel F. Spulber, Finding Reasonable Royalty Damages: A Con-
tract Approach to Patent Infringement, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 696 (“[T]he 
‘Cournot Effect’ is based on the assumption that complementary input monop-
olists choose ‘posted prices.’ This means that the input monopolists announce 
prices that they will charge to downstream producers.’”). 
 41. See Daniel F. Spulber, Complementary Monopolies and Bargaining, 60 
J.L. & ECON. 29, 42 (2017) (“In Cournot’s model, input suppliers choose prices ri 
(i = 1, . . . , n), and downstream producers choose how much of the inputs to 
purchase.”). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See generally COURNOT, supra note 26 (establishing the economic prin-
ciple of the “Cournot Effect”). 
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should recognize that patent license agreements are formed 
through negotiation rather than “take-it-or-leave-it” prices. An-
titrust policy also should recognize that the market power of pa-
tent holders is less than 100% and cost-pass through for royal-
ties is less than 100%. 
Table 1 summarizes the discussion. The discussion is orga-
nized as follows. Section II examines why patent license agree-
ments are negotiated and considers how negotiation affects the 
provisions of patent license agreements. Section III explains the 
Cournot model and shows how its application to patent licensing 
is misleading for antitrust policy. Section IV examines the anti-
trust policy implications of negotiation in the market for patent 
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II. NEGOTIATION OF PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
Practically all patent license agreements are negotiated, 
with the exception of those offered by patent pools. This section 
examines why patent license agreements are negotiated and in-
troduces a negotiation framework. The analysis shows that ne-
gotiated patent license agreements are efficient in competitive 
markets. With complementary inventions, total royalties are 
less than what a bundled monopoly inventor would offer. The 
discussion also explains that patent pools serve to mitigate 
transaction costs. 
A. WHY PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED 
Patent license agreements require negotiation because they 
are contracts between patent holders and technology adopters.44 
Patent license agreements resist standardization because the 
provisions of the contract are tailored to the characteristics and 
requirements of the parties.45 Each patent licensing agreement 
includes rights and obligations specific to the combination of the 
licensor and licensee.46 This explains the considerable variation 
across patent license agreements.47 
Technology provides another source of variation across pa-
tent license agreements. The patented technology is necessarily 
unique to the patent holder because inventions must be novel 
 
 44. See Daniel F. Spulber, Intellectual Contract and Intellectual Law, 23 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2018) (“Through [Intellectual Contracts] such as licens-
ing agreements, patent holders and technology adopters determine how tech-
nology will be applied. Firms require [Intellectual Contracts] to form agree-
ments with employees, suppliers, partners, distributors, investors, and 
customers.”); Spulber, supra note 40, at 620 (“[A] patent license agreement is a 
contract.”) (emphasis original). 
 45. Raymond C. Nordhaus, Patent License Agreements, 21 BUS. LAW. 643, 
643 (1966) (“Because of the infinite variety of rights and obligations that may 
be established between a patent licensor and his licensee, there is no ‘standard’ 
form of license agreement that may be used in all situations. Each license agree-
ment must be carefully tailored to the specific circumstances of the particular 
case.”). 
 46. See generally ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., Contracts and Agreements to 
Support Partnerships, in GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN 
HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES  
(2007), www.ipHandbook.org (explaining contracting and appropriate provi-
sions for intellectual property). 
 47. See Christian Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts: 
Features and Diversity, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 451, 470 (1998). 
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and non-obvious.48 The benefits from applying that unique tech-
nology likely will vary across adopters because adopters operate 
different businesses. This implies that the combination of the li-
censor’s technology with the licensee’s application and business 
characteristics is likely to produce unique outcomes and varia-
tion across patent license agreements. 
Negotiation is required because the purpose of the agree-
ment is to maximize the parties’ gains from trade generated by 
the technology transfer.49 These gains from trade depend on the 
characteristics of the technology provided by the patent holder 
and the profit generated by the adopter’s application of the tech-
nology.50 Ronald Coase emphasized that negotiation allows par-
ties to reach efficient agreements by adjusting for the allocation 
of property ownership and legal constraints.51 The parties to pa-
tent license agreements adjust for the allocation of intellectual 
property (IP) and the effects of patent law and other regulatory 
restrictions. 
Further, negotiation of patent license agreements is neces-
sary because these licenses are contracts rather than immediate 
transactions.52 The adoption and application of technology takes 
time. It takes time for technology adopters to obtain market re-
turns to innovation. The technology adopter may need to invest 
resources to understand and absorb the new technology.53 This 
can involve hiring and training employees, investing in capital 
 
 48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). 
 49. See ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., Technology and Product Licensing, in 
GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICUL-
TURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (2007), www.ipHand-
book.org. 
 50. C.f. Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Mar-
ket for Inventions, 11 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 271, 291 (2015) (“The interaction of 
demand and supply in the market for innovation control determines the market 
value of inventions. Inventors compete to supply producers with inventions, and 
producers compete to obtain inventions or develop their own inventions. The 
market value of an invention reflects competition from both substitute and com-
plementary inventions on the supply side of the market for inventions. The mar-
ket value of inventions depends on the stock of inventions and anticipation of 
future discoveries that may enhance the demand for particular inventions or 
render those inventions obsolete.”). 
 51. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). 
 52. See, e.g., ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., supra note 46, at 85. 
 53. See Daniel F. Spulber, Tacit Knowledge with Innovative Entrepreneur-
ship, 30 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 641, 644 (2012). 
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equipment, and acquiring complementary technologies.54 The 
technology adopter may develop inventions that are complemen-
tary to the transferred technology. The technology adopter may 
also develop innovations that apply the transferred technology. 
The technology adopter may realize the revenues and cost sav-
ings from the new technology over some period of time. 
Because application of the technology takes time, the provi-
sions of the patent license agreement typically reflect repeated 
interactions in the context of the business relationship between 
the patent holder and the technology implementer. Radauer and 
Dudenbostel emphasize the need for negotiation because “con-
siderable interaction must take place between licensors and li-
censees, on a bilateral and rather informal level.”55 Krattiger et 
al. observe that, “[i]n sum, licensing is about the development of 
relationships. As important as the terms of agreements are, few 
are more important than the long-term opportunities offered by 
forging good partnerships . . . . Negotiating an agreement is just 
the beginning of what may—or should—become a long-lasting 
and beneficial relationship.”56 
Application of inventions involves risk because the proper-
ties of new technologies are not fully understood. The combina-
tion of inventions to generate innovative products involves vari-
ous types of risk as well.57 There are risks involved in the 
designing of new products, developing new production processes, 
and using new transaction methods.58 The market risks of 
 
 54. Spulber, supra note 50, at 295 (“The market for innovative control also 
provides incentives to invest efficiently in complementary assets. Assets that 
are complementary to inventions include human resources, absorption of inven-
tions, IP, product design, capital equipment, marketing, sales, procurement, 
and establishment of new firms.”). 
 55. ALFRED RADAUER & TOBIAS DUDENBOSTEL, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
EUR 26114 EN PATLICE SURVEY: SURVEY ON PATENT LICENSING ACTIVITIES 
BY PATENTING FIRMS 51 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-un-
ion/pdf/patlice-survey.pdf. 
 56. ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., supra note 46, at 128. 
 57. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercial-
izing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (“[T]he treatment of patents 
as property rights is necessary to facilitate investment in the complex, costly, 
and risky commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions into 
new goods and services.”). 
 58. Cf. id. at 707–08 (“The invention must be developed into some commer-
cial embodiment. Capital may have to be raised. Production facilities and labor 
must be made available. Distribution channels must be created. Consumers 
must be educated about the existence and benefits of this new good or service.”). 
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introducing innovations can be greater than for existing prod-
ucts, production processes, and transaction methods.59 
Negotiation of patent licensing agreements is necessary be-
cause licensing often occurs where invention meets innovation. 
There is empirical evidence for complementarities between in-
ternal research and development (R&D) and the acquisition of 
external knowledge.60 The IP owner provides inventions created 
through R&D.61 The IP adopter provides applications for the in-
ventions and complementary assets.62 Innovation occurs when 
the application of invention introduces something new to the 
market.63 
Patent license contracts are the basis of the “market for in-
novative control.”64 Patent holders not only receive returns to 
their inventions but also exercise control over how the invention 
will be improved, commercialized, applied in innovation, and 
used in production.65 Ownership of assets includes both financial 
returns and control rights.66 The same applies to IP.67 Patent 
 
 59. Id. at 708–09 (noting that later entrants to the market frequently bear 
less risk). 
 60. See Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Complementarity and Exter-
nal Linkages: The Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology, 38 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 361, 373–74 (1990); Iain M. Cockburn & Rebecca M. Henderson, Absorp-
tive Capacity, Coauthoring Behavior and the Organization of Research in Drug 
Discovery, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 157, 158 (1998); Marco Ceccagnoli et al., Produc-
tivity and the Role of Complementary Assets in Firms’ Demand for Technology 
Innovations, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 839, 863–64 (2010); Marco Ceccagnoli 
et al., Behind the Scenes: Sources of Complementarity in R&D, 23 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 144 (2014); Bruno Cassiman & Reinhilde Veugelers, In 
Search of Complementarity in Innovation Strategy: Internal R&D and External 
Knowledge Acquisition, 52 MGMT. SCI. 68, 80 (2006). 
 61. See Spulber, supra note 50, at 297 (“Inventors create inventions by ap-
plying effort, knowledge, ingenuity, capabilities, insights, and scientific obser-
vations. If R&D is successful, the discovery may be valuable in commercial ap-
plications or as an input to further R&D.”). 
 62. See id. at 294 (“The market for innovative control also allows the entry 
of specialized intermediaries who can invest in commercialization, innovation, 
and complementary assets.”). 
 63. See Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 142, 142 (2010) (“Innovation therefore differs from invention. It includes not 
only the initial discovery or the creation of potential new products or processes, 
but also their subsequent development and commercialization.”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 64. See Spulber, supra note 50, at 274. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 290. 
 67. See id. at 290–91. 
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holders receive returns from licensing and their own use.68 Pa-
tent holders also have rights of control.69 For this reason, the 
market value of a patent reflects both financial returns and con-
trol rights.70 The price of transferred patents reflects the value 
of financial returns and control rights. 
The licensor delegates some innovative control to the licen-
see. The patent licensing contract grants rights to practice the 
invention to the licensee.71 The patent licensing contract speci-
fies consideration, usually in the form of patent royalties to the 
licensor.72 Consideration is based on the IP adopter’s expected 
returns from innovation.73 The IP owner also may innovate by 
making improvements on the invention.74 The interaction be-
tween invention and innovation through patent licensing con-
tracts has a number of implications.75 
Companies that are patent holders occasionally make an-
nouncements regarding expected royalties, but these announce-
ments usually are initial bargaining positions that differ sub-
stantially from the outcomes of negotiations between patent 
owners and producers.76 Stasik observes that “an ‘announced’ 
royalty rate may be significantly different than the ‘actual’ roy-
alty rate resulting from a bi-lateral negotiation. Having made a 
public announcement, a potential licensee might reasonably ex-
pect this to be the opening offer in a negotiation. That is all that 
should be assumed from these announcements.”77 In discussing 
LTE royalties, Stasik predicts that “[t]hose companies who have 
negotiation power will pay less—the best ones will pay much 
 
 68. Id. at 290. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 290–93. 
 71. Id. at 295 (“[T]he market for innovative control allows separation of 
ownership and control. The patent owner can obtain returns from the patented 
invention while delegating control over innovation to licensees who employ the 
technology.”). 
 72. See Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty 
Base in Patent Licensing, 59 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2016). 
 73. See Spulber, supra note 40, at 618. 
 74. See Spulber, supra note 50, at 274. 
 75. See generally Spulber, supra note 50 (discussing how patents and pa-
tent licensing creates a “market of inventions” that includes the various meth-
ods of innovating based on the patented inventions). 
 76. See Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential 
Patents on LTE (4G) Telecommunication Standards, 2010 NOUVELLES 114, 
116–17 (2010). 
 77. Id. at 116–117. 
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less.”78 Bargaining power is an important determinant of patent 
license royalties.79 
Negotiation of patent license contracts is necessary because 
new business agreements require creativity. Goldscheider’s 
guide to negotiating IP license agreements suggests that such 
agreements “should be creative in both organization and struc-
ture.”80 Goldscheider finds that “by combining resources from 
several aspects of various intra-party business dealings, practi-
tioners can frequently generate greater income for both parties 
to a negotiation.”81 He argues that royalty rates should not be 
standardized because “royalties are essentially an expression of 
underlying contemplated profitability.”82 Goldscheider warns 
that that “a ‘bad’ royalty standard drives out innovation in in-
dustry.”83 
There is considerable empirical evidence that parties nego-
tiate IP license contracts. The World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) and the International Trade Centre (ITC) 
provide a training manual (“WIPO Manual”) that is devoted to 
license negotiation.84 Referring to the royalty rate in license 
agreements, the WIPO Manual states “[i]t is important that the 
rate results in a good business proposition for both parties, and 
so negotiation of the royalty rate is fundamental to the success 
of the agreement.”85 The WIPO manual further observes “[a] suc-
cessful ongoing relationship is based on a contract with mutually 
acceptable terms. In this context, the importance of negotiation 
cannot be underestimated.”86 The WIPO manual points out that 
negotiating a technology licensing agreement is an art.87 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Mariko Sakakibara, An Empirical Analysis of Pricing in Patent Licens-
ing Contracts, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 927, 927–45 (2010). 
 80. Robert Goldscheider, The Negotiation of Royalties and Other Sources of 
Income from Licensing, 36 IDEA 1, 1 (1995). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 16. 
 83. Id. at 16 n.6. 
 84. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. & INT’L TRADE CTR., EXCHANGING VALUE, 
NEGOTIATING TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AGREEMENTS: A TRAINING MANUAL 
(WIPO publication No. 906(E), Jan. 2005). 
 85. Id. at 57. 
 86. Id. at 10. 
 87. Id. at 82 (“Negotiating a technology licensing agreement is the art of 
reaching an agreement where the licensor grants and the licensee acquires the 
right to use the licensor’s technology on specified terms and conditions.”). 
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The European Patent Office (EPO) Handbook for Inventors 
explains in great detail how to negotiate licensing agreements.88 
Significantly, the EPO handbook does not offer any discussion of 
“take-it-or-leave-it” royalties or standardized contracts. Accord-
ing to the EPO, negotiation of a licensing agreement usually in-
volves two stages.89 First, the “heads of agreement” stage iden-
tifies the terms and conditions of the agreement.90 Second, at the 
full agreement stage, the parties prepare the legal agreement 
based on the heads of agreement.91 
Although the parties to a licensing agreement negotiate roy-
alties, these are but one aspect of the agreement. The main focus 
of licensing contracts is on maximizing mutual benefits; the roy-
alties are a way of dividing those benefits. As Goldscheider 
points out, “royalty rates are merely expressions, or mechanical 
forms of calculation, employed by parties when making decisions 
or assumptions based upon profitability.”92 According to 
Schroeder, 
[i]n reality, most royalties represent an effort to divide between the 
licensee and the licensor the expected profit on the licensed product 
above the usual profit of the licensee on products of this type. When 
the advantage of the invention is a cost savings for the licensee (com-
mon in the case of a licensed process), the royalty represents a division 
of the savings.93 
Epstein and Malherbe also emphasize that royalties are ne-
gotiated and observe that negotiated royalties depend on the 
availability of alternatives and design-arounds, cost savings, 
and investment in commercialization and innovation.94 They 
point out that negotiated royalties “may be part of a complex 
transaction that includes joint licensing of other patents (i.e., 
 
 88. Negotiating a Licensing Agreement, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.
epo.org/learning/materials/inventors-handbook/dealing-with-companies/
licensing.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2016). 
 89. Reaching Agreement, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/learning/
materials/inventors-handbook/dealing-with-companies/agreement.html (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2016). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Goldscheider, supra note 80, at 1. 
 93. Robert A. Schroeder, Licensing of Rights to Intellectual Property, 50 
ALB. L. REV. 455, 460 (1986). 
 94. Roy J. Epstein & Paul Malherbe, Reasonable Royalty Patent Infringe-
ment Damages After Uniloc, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 3, 8 (2011). 
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patent pooling), cross-licenses, know-how, and/or product sup-
port.”95 
Some attribute negotiation of IP license agreements to the 
need for further development of markets for IP. IBM has been a 
leading recipient of U.S. patents for almost 25 years.96 IBM’s 
chief patent counsel, Manny Schecter, observes that “it’s the lev-
erage we are able to get from the patent [licensing] negotia-
tions.”97 Schecter asks, 
[w]hat if there were no Kelley Blue Book for used cars[?] . . . If the mar-
ketplace for used cars were the same as the market for patents it would 
be very frustrating. We tolerate this in the IP marketplace because we 
are in the early stages of the development of the marketplace. What 
must it have been like 50 years ago when you would buy a used 
car? The amount of information available for the ordinary person was 
pretty slim.98 
Schecter explains that “he doesn’t expect full transparency 
because licensing negotiations and litigation settlements go on 
privately.”99 
Negotiation also is a fundamental element of cross licensing 
for IBM. For example, IBM entered into a cross licensing deal 
with Western Digital in 2016.100 According to William LaFon-
taine, general manager of intellectual property for IBM, “[t]his 
agreement with Western Digital illustrates the value of patented 
IBM inventions and demonstrates our leadership in licensing ac-
cess to our broad patent portfolio. We look forward to a produc-
tive relationship with Western Digital.”101 
Nonprofit institutions also negotiate patent license agree-
ments. A study of university licensing by Siegel et al. observes 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Daryl K. Taft, IBM Inks Patent Cross-License Deal with Western Digi-
tal, EWEEK (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.eweek.com/it-management/ibm-inks-
patent-cross-license-deal-with-western-digital. 
 97. Khurram Aziz, The Most Innovative Firm in the World: IBM’s Patent 
Strategy, INTELL. PROP. MAG. (Feb. 1, 2012), 
https://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/patent/the-most-innovative-
firm-in-the-world-ibm-s-patent-strategy-90180.htm. 
 98. Gene Quinn, IBM’s Formula for Success: Patents, Patents and More Pa-
tents, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.ipwatch-
dog.com/2012/01/11/ibms-formula-for-success-patents-patents-and-more-pa-
tents/id=21722/. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Darryl K. Taft, supra note 96 (discussing generally the patent deal 
between IBM and Western Digital). 
 101. Taft, supra note 96. 
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that once a patent has been awarded, the technology transfer 
office (TTO) markets the technology to potential corporate licen-
sees: “The next stage of the model involves working with firms 
or entrepreneurs to negotiate a licensing agreement.”102 Jensen 
and Thursby find that auctions are not a good description of li-
censing by universities because TTOs experience difficulties in 
locating licensees for early stage inventions, which is what is 
usually licensed by universities.103 
Government agencies also negotiate patent license agree-
ments. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA) negotiates royalties for all of its licenses: 
“All NASA licenses are individually negotiated with the prospec-
tive licensee, and each license contains terms concerning trans-
fer (practical application), license duration, royalties, and peri-
odic reporting.”104 At the Department of Energy, the Agreement 
for Commercializing Technology (ACT) allows contractors who 
operate government-owned laboratories “to negotiate terms and 
conditions that are more consistent with private industry prac-
tice, such as IP rights, payment arrangements, indemnification, 
and development of multi-party R&D partnerships.”105 
The Courts recognize that patent license agreements are ne-
gotiated. The Courts often calculate reasonable royalty damages 
from patent infringement based on the hypothetical negotiation 
between a willing licensor and a willing licensee. The hypothet-
ical negotiation framework is inconsistent with evidence because 
it is based on conjectures about what the parties would have ex-
pected before infringement began.106 Imagining a hypothetical 
negotiation imposes an impossible burden on the court because 
it must construct expectations that would not have been availa-
ble even to the parties involved. Rather, the reasonable royalty 
 
 102. Donald S. Siegel et al., Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Sci-
entific Knowledge from Academicians to Practitioners: Qualitative Evidence 
from the Commercialization of University Technologies, 21 J. ENG’G & TECH. 
MGMT. 115, 118 (2004). 
 103. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The 
Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 245 (2001). 
 104. How to License an Ames Patent or Patent Application, NASA, 
https://technology-arc.ndc.nasa.gov/licensing (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
 105. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., RETURN ON INVESTMENT INITIATIVE 
FOR UNLEASHING AMERICAN INNOVATION 61 n.158 (Apr. 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1234. 
 106. Daniel F. Spulber, Finding Reasonable Royalty Damages: A Contract 
Approach to Patent Infringement, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 656 (2019). 
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damages should be based on constructing an “informed contract” 
applying the evidence uncovered by the patent case.107 The “in-
formed contract” reflects the characteristics of the parties in the 
patent dispute, the extent of the infringement, and the patents 
having been found to be valid and infringed upon.108 
Many legal decisions emphasize negotiation of patent li-
cense agreements. The influential Georgia-Pacific case sets forth 
fifteen factors that might be used to estimate royalties from a 
hypothetical negotiation.109 The last factor recognizes that roy-
alties are established through negotiation: 
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such 
as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement 
began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an 
agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee — who de-
sired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and 
sell a particular article embodying the patented invention — would 
have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reason-
able profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent 
patentee who was willing to grant a license.110 
Judge Tenney points out that patent license negotiation 
takes place within the context of market forces.111 The Georgia 
Pacific factors include the other terms of the contract and the 
characteristics of the licensor and the licensee.112 
 
 107. Id. at 623. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 110. Id. at 1120 (Tenney, J.) (“The rule is more a statement of approach than 
a tool of analysis. It requires consideration not only of the amount that a willing 
licensee would have paid for the patent license but also of the amount that a 
willing licensor would have accepted. What a willing licensor and a willing li-
censee would have agreed upon in a supposititious negotiation for a reasonable 
royalty would entail consideration of the specific factors previously mentioned, 
to the extent of their relevance.”). 
 111. Id. at 1121 (Tenney, J.) (“Where a willing licensor and a willing licensee 
are negotiating for a royalty, the hypothetical negotiations would not occur in a 
vacuum of pure logic. They would involve a market place confrontation of the 
parties, the outcome of which would depend upon such factors as their relative 
bargaining strength; the anticipated amount of profits that the prospective li-
censor reasonably thinks he would lose as a result of licensing the patent as 
compared to the anticipated royalty income; the anticipated amount of net prof-
its that the prospective licensee reasonably thinks he will make; the commercial 
past performance of the invention in terms of public acceptance and profits; the 
market to be tapped; and any other economic factor that normally prudent busi-
nessmen would, under similar circumstances, take into consideration in nego-
tiating the hypothetical license.”). 
 112. Id. at 1120. 
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Negotiation of patent license contracts is the primary means 
of settling patent disputes. Lanjouw and Schankerman find that 
95% of patent disputes are settled out of court.113 The terms of 
the patent license agreement depend on various factors includ-
ing legal costs, reasonable royalty damages for patent infringe-
ment, and the likelihood that an infringement lawsuit will be 
successful.114 Kesan and Ball observe, “[o]bviously, an out-of-
court negotiation of a licensing agreement is similar to a negoti-
ation of a settlement agreement once the case has been filed.”115 
Implementers of technology standards often must negotiate 
licenses with many holders of SEPs. Combining complementary 
inventions entails substantial coordination costs.116 Creating 
complex innovations requires technology providers and imple-
menters to engage in many interrelated market transactions.117 
Producer profits depend on the provisions of multiple IP con-
tracts.118 Also, the technical specifications of parts, components, 
products, and services must allow compatibility and interopera-
bility.119 To address these coordination costs, industries estab-
lish standards organizations and create technology standards.120 
 
 113. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. ECON. 45, 48 (stating that 
“lowering the cost of enforcement is the fact that postfiling settlement rates are 
high (about 95 percent) and that most settlement occurs soon after the suit is 
filed, often before the pretrial hearing is held.”). 
 114. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Dis-
putes, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 237, 243 (2006) (stating that in deciding whether to 
litigate or license, economic theory favors weighing various factors to determine 
potential costs and benefits). 
 115. Id. at 254. 
 116. Gupta, supra note 6, at 844–45 (discussing how complex technologies 
involve negotiating multiple licenses which may increase transaction costs). 
 117. Id. at 844 (“[I]t is widely understood that the nature of complex tech-
nologies involves many patents owned by different parties reading on single 
product.”). 
 118. Id. (discussing the effects of “royalty stacking” on downstream manu-
facturers of complex technologies). 
 119. Daniel F. Spulber, Innovation Economics: The Interplay Among Tech-
nology Standards, Competitive Conduct, and Economic Performance, 9 J. COMP. 
L. & ECON. 777, 788–90 (2013) (explaining the economic benefits and desirabil-
ity of modularity in technological systems and that interoperability is necessary 
to modularity). 
 120. See Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents with 
FRAND Commitments: Preparing for 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18.1 
COLO. TECH. L.J. 79, 82–83 (2020) (stating that industries create Standard 
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Negotiation is the basis of the requirement that holders of 
standard essential patents (SEPs) license on terms that are 
“Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory” (FRAND). Stand-
ard setting organizations (SSOs) require SEP holders to commit 
to licenses on terms that are FRAND as a condition for including 
their patents in technology standards.121 SSOs include standard 
development organizations (SDOs), umbrella organizations, and 
industry consortia.122 SSOs do not spell out the meaning or im-
plications of FRAND commitments but instead rely on market 
negotiation to determine the content of FRAND commitments.123 
There is considerable evidence that SEP holders and implement-
ers negotiate patent license agreements.124 The large number of 
SEPs and the widespread implementation of technology stand-
ards indicate the significant scope of the market for patent li-
cense agreements.125 Market negotiation of SEP licenses gener-
ally involves bilateral negotiation between each SEP holder and 
each implementer.126 
Intermediated transactions in the market for patent license 
contracts typically involve negotiation. Intermediaries reduce 
transaction costs and offer the convenience of one-stop shop-
ping.127 Intermediaries may achieve greater transaction efficien-
cies and bargaining power in patent licensing negotiation than 
 
Setting Organizations that facilitate development of technology standards, and 
broadly outlining the effects of technology standards). 
 121. Id. at 82. 
 122. Id. at 86. 
 123. Id. at 83. 
 124. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND, LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD ES-
SENTIAL PATENTS (SEPS) 36, (2016), https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/04/Pohlmann_IPlytics_2017_EU-report_landscaping-SEPs.pdf 
(stating the majority of SEPs are individually licensed, partially out of fear that 
negotiating leverage will be lost in a patent pool). 
 125. Spulber, supra note 120, at 121–22. 
 126. See J. Gregory. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9(4) J. 
COMPETITION L. ECON. 931, 985 (2013) (“The hypothetical negotiation at the 
time of standard adoption is properly cast as a series of simultaneous, bilateral 
negotiations between the SEP holder and each of the implementers.”). 
 127. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kennith L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. 
Market for Technology, 1870–1920, in FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 209, 209–13 (Stanley L. Engerman et al. eds., 2003). See 
generally James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 
189–228 (2006) (arguing there is greater market efficiency as a result of inter-
mediaries). 
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individual patent holders.128 Hagiu and Yoffie observe “[t]he pa-
tent market consists mainly of bilateral transactions, either 
sales or cross-licenses, between large companies. Such deals are 
privately negotiated and might involve hundreds or thousands 
of patents.”129 An FTC study of “Patent Assertion Entities” 
(PAEs) found substantial reliance on negotiation.130 
 
B. WHY NEGOTIATION MATTERS FOR PATENT LICENSING 
This section introduces a patent licensing negotiation 
framework. The main insight is that with negotiation, royalties 
are strictly less than what would be chosen by a monopolist li-
censing the bundle of complementary inventions. This estab-
lishes that patent licensing with complementary inventions 
should not be viewed as an antitrust problem. 
In the negotiation framework, royalties are established 
through negotiation by pairs of patent holders and technology 
adopters. The negotiation framework recognizes that patent 
holders do not make commitments in the form of take-it-or-
leave-it royalty offers. The analysis is sufficiently general that it 
allows a patent holder and a technology adopter to have asym-
metric bargaining power. The analysis allows patent holders to 
have any relative bargaining power greater than zero and less 
than 100%. 
The downstream product market is presumed to be perfectly 
competitive as in the textbook model of supply and demand. This 
means that the market price in the product market is such that 
total demand equals total supply. Buyers choose the quantity of 
 
 128. See Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity 
Activities—“Follow the Money,” 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 429 (2014); John E. Du-
biansky, The Licensing Function of Patent Intermediaries, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 269, 271 (2017). 
 129. Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Plat-
forms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 45 
(2013). Some intermediaries such as Avanci, however, offer fixed prices. See 
AVANCI, ACCELERATING IOT CONNECTIVITY (2020), 
https://www.avanci.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Avanci-White-Paper.pdf 
(offering fixed prices as opposed to privately negotiating deals). 
 130. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC 
STUDY 1, (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-as-
sertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activ-
ity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf (“PAEs monetize their patents primarily through licens-
ing negotiations with alleged infringers, infringement litigation, or both.”). 
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the good to demand based on the market price. Technology 
adopters are the sellers in the downstream market and they 
choose the quantity of the good to supply based on the market 
price. The assumption of perfect competition allows for a com-
parison to the Cournot model, which also assumes that the prod-
uct market is perfectly competitive.131 
The negotiation framework assumes that patent holders 
take the downstream product market price as given. Patent 
holders negotiate with adopters and choose royalties that are 
contingent on the realization of the product market price. 
Adopters and patent holders should have consistent perspectives 
on the market price. If adopters take the product market price 
as given, it is reasonable to believe that patent holders also take 
the product market price as given. This contrasts with the 
Cournot model in which adopters are price takers in the down-
stream market but patent holders are price setters in the down-
stream market. In the Cournot model, adopters choose royalties 
with full knowledge of the effects of royalties on the downstream 
market price. 
Also, the perspectives of the negotiating parties should be 
consistent over time. The negotiating parties should not be able 
to anticipate the effects of royalties on the market price during 
negotiations and later take the product market price as given. 
This would require that adopters have knowledge about the ef-
fects of royalties on product prices during negotiation and then 
forget these effects after negotiation when the product market 
clears. 
The negotiation framework allows the parties to choose the 
form of royalty arrangements. Negotiated patent license agree-
ments in practice involve many types of royalty arrangements 
that are contingent on market outcomes. These arrangements 
can involve profit shares, equity, and options.132 Varner finds 
 
 131. The analysis can be extended to allow for imperfect competition in the 
downstream product market but that is beyond the present discussion. 
 132. See Nicos Savva & Niyazi Taneri, The Role of Equity, Royalty, and 
Fixed Fees in Technology Licensing to University Spin-Offs, 61(6) MGMT. SCI. 
1323, 1324 (2015) (“[I]t is optimal for [a university Technology Transfer Office 
(TTO)] to offer contracts that include royalties alongside equity.”); Pascale 
Crama, Bert De Reyck & Niyazi Taneri, Licensing Contracts: Control Rights, 
Options, and Timing, 63(4) MGMT. SCI. 1131, 1145 (2017) (demonstrating “how 
control rights, options, and timing can be used, in conjunction with various pay-
ment terms, to address the inefficiencies that may occur when innovators and 
marketers form partnerships to develop and market new products.”). 
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that patent licenses includes various contingent arrangements: 
“joint venture agreements, product bundling or re-branding 
agreements, distribution agreements, settlement agreements, 
manufacturing and supply agreements, employment agree-
ments, and acquisition agreements.”133 Varner finds elsewhere 
that when patent license agreements involve running royalties, 
90% are contingent on sales revenue rather than units of output 
sold.134 Elfenbein observes that royalties in university licensing 
agreements involve payments contingent on sales, lump-sum li-
cense fees, milestones, maintenance fees and minimums, and eq-
uity.135 Finch finds that some biotechnology companies seek al-
liances and mergers and acquisitions in addition to negotiating 
licenses.136 
In the market for patent licenses, as in many other markets, 
the parties are involved in many bilateral negotiations. Technol-
ogy adopters negotiate with multiple patent holders and patent 
holders negotiate with multiple technology adopters.137 Those bi-
lateral negotiations are inevitably interdependent because one 
party’s returns from one agreement can affect that party’s 
 
 133. Thomas R. Varner, An Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Struc-
ture and Provisions, 46 BUS. ECON. 229, 230 (2011) (referencing analysis results 
from his previous paper in 2010) [hereinafter Varner, Patent Licensing]. See 
generally Thomas R. Varner, Technology Royalty Rates in SEC Filings, 45 
NOUVELLES 120, 120–27 (2010) (presenting results from analysis of technology 
licenses containing various types of agreements) [hereinafter Varner, Royalty 
Rates]. 
 134. Varner, Royalty Rates, supra note 133, at 233. 
 135. See Daniel W. Elfenbein, Contract Structure and Performance of Uni-
versity-Industry Technology Transfer Agreements 11 (July 30, 
2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452717 (listing the five subcategories of pay-
ment provisions that are common in contracts for university technology licens-
ing agreements); see also Deepak Hegde, Tacit Knowledge and the Structure of 
License Contracts: Evidence from the Biomedical Industry, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 568 (2014) (comparing the characteristics that make up biomedical 
license agreement contracts between inventors and developers); Richard Jensen 
& Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University 
Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001) (exploring the parameters that com-
prise university licensing agreements, and arguing that without an economic 
incentive for the inventor, sponsored research alone is insufficient to foster de-
velopment). 
 136. Sharon Finch, Royalty Rates: Current Issues and Trends, 7 J. COM. BI-
OTECH. 224, 230 (2001). 
 137. See Sidak, supra note 126, at 985. 
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returns from other agreements.138 In practice, individuals typi-
cally enter into many contracts simultaneously, such as those 
with employers, insurance companies, and service providers. 
Firms simultaneously engage in many contracts with employees, 
customers, suppliers, and partners.139 This is why the firm in 
general has been characterized as a “nexus for contracting rela-
tionships.”140 
Negotiation has been studied extensively by economists. An 
important approach characterizes the outcomes of bargaining 
based on a set of desirable properties stated as axioms. John 
Nash set forth a set of basic axioms that should be satisfied by 
bargaining between two parties.141 The Nash bargaining solu-
tion is the unique outcome that satisfies those axioms.142 The 
Nash bargaining solution involves equal division of the gains 
from trade for the two parties.143 Nash’s characterization of bar-
gaining extends readily to allow different relative bargaining 
powers of the two parties.144 Then, the outcome of bargaining is 
a unique solution that specifies different shares of the net bene-
fits from exchange.145 The negotiation framework presented here 
allows asymmetric bargaining power. 
 
 138. See generally Spulber, supra note 41; Daniel F. Spulber, Patent Licens-
ing and Bargaining with Innovative Complements and Substitutes, 70 RES. 
ECON. 693 (2016) [hereinafter Spulber, Patent Licensing]. 
 139. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
310 (1976). 
 140. Id. at 311. 
 141. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 
155–62 (1950) [hereinafter Nash, Bargaining Problem]; John F. Nash, Jr., Two-
Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128, 136–40 (1953) [hereinafter 
Nash, Cooperative Games]. 
 142. Nash, Cooperative Games, supra note 141, at 129. 
 143. Nash, Bargaining Problem, supra note 141, at 155. 
 144. See Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, & Asher Wolinsky, The Nash Bar-
gaining Solution in Economic Modelling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176, 186 (1986) 
(“Modellers [sic] often use the asymmetric Nash solution in an attempt to cap-
ture some imprecisely defined differences in ‘bargaining power,’ where a large 
exponent α is interpreted as representing a relatively high bargaining power of 
party 1.”). 
 145. Id. at 177 (“A unique perfect equilibrium outcome of such a game is 
then viewed as the solution to the bargaining situation studied.”); Ariel Rubin-
stein & Asher Wolinsky, Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, 
53 ECONOMETRICA 1133, 1149 (1985) (“In their models when two agents meet 
they agree immediately on an equal division of the difference between the unit 
and the sum of their reservation values. That is, they adopt Nash’s bargaining 
solution.”); Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 
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The negotiation framework presented here applies an im-
portant approach known as Nash-in-Nash bargaining.146 Nash-
in-Nash bargaining is useful for examining simultaneous bar-
gaining among multiple bargaining pairs.147 With Nash-in-Nash 
bargaining, each bargaining pair takes the equilibrium out-
comes of other bargaining pairs as given.148 The outcome of bar-
gaining for a particular bargaining pair is a “best response” to 
the outcomes of bargaining for other pairs of market partici-
pants.149 This approach has been extended and applied in a va-
riety of settings such as industry labor negotiations.150 
The negotiation framework characterizes multiple patent li-
censing agreements. Based on Nash-in-Nash bargaining, each 
patent holder and adopter pair takes as given the equilibrium 
 
ECONOMETRICA 97, 100 (1982) (describing bargaining in terms of “the partition 
of a pie”). 
 146. Harsanyi extends the Nash bargaining framework to consider simulta-
neous Nash bargaining between many pairs of economic agents. In Harsanyi’s 
analysis, the negotiated agreements between pairs of economic agents are in-
terrelated. The final outcome depends on what each pair of economic agents can 
obtain in various groupings of agents and what groups of economic agents can 
obtain in the set of bilateral agreements. John C. Harsanyi, A Bargaining Model 
for the Cooperative n-Person Game, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF 
GAMES IV, 40 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STUDIES, 325 (A. W. Tucker & R. D. 
Luce, eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1963); John C. Harsanyi, A Simplified Bar-
gaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game, 4 INT’L ECON. REV. 194 
(1963); John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, A Generalized Nash Solution for 
Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information, 18 MGMT. SCI. 80 
(1972). 
 147. This combines the Nash bargaining solution with the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is a game theory con-
cept in which individual players take the equilibrium moves of other players as 
given when formulating their strategies. John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 
54 ANNALS MATHEMATICS 286, 287 (1951). 
 148. Allan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robin S. Lee, Nash-
in-Nash Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work, 127 J. POL. ECON. 
163, 165 (2019). 
 149. Id. at 184. 
 150. Horn and Wolinsky further develop the Nash-in-Nash bargaining 
framework. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, Bilateral Monopolies and Incen-
tives for Merger, 19 RAND J. ECON. 408 (1988). For an overview of applications 
and extension of the Nash-in-Nash bargaining framework to allow strategic in-
teraction over time with repeated counter offers, see Allan Collard-Wexler, Gau-
tam Gowrisankaran & Robin S. Lee, Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: A Microfoun-
dation for Applied Work, 127 J. POL. ECON. 163 (2019). For a study on Nash-in-
Nash bargaining in comparison to the Cournot complementary monopolies 
model, see Spulber, supra note 41. Nash-in-Nash bargaining can also be consid-
ered with patent licensing when inventions can be imperfect complements or 
substitutes. Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138. 
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royalties for other patent holder and adopter pairs. Negotiation 
results in a division of each adopter’s profit from applying the 
patented inventions net of the value of the best alternative. This 
approach is not restrictive, because similar results would hold 
for almost any bargaining model. Most bargaining models imply 
sharing of benefits among multiple players. 
The negotiation framework has the following features. Con-
sider an industry in which there are N patent holders and M 
technology adopters. Both patent holders and adopters take the 
product market price p as given so that negotiation is contingent 
on the market price. To simplify the discussion, suppose that 
adopters have the same production cost function C(q) where q is 
an adopter’s output. The framework can be extended to allow for 
cost differences among adopters. 
The cost function is such that marginal costs are increasing 
in output.151 So, each adopter has an upward-sloping supply 
curve. This rules out the extreme assumption of an infinite elas-
ticity of supply for technology adopters that is assumed in the 
Cournot model. An upward sloping supply function means that 
royalties are passed through to final prices at any rate that is 
greater than zero and less than 100%. 
The N inventions are perfect complements and an adopter 
must apply all of the inventions to operate in the market. Patent 
holders and adopters negotiate bilaterally over royalties. Each 
patent holder and adopter pair negotiates a per-unit royalty and 
a lump-sum royalty. So, each patent holder indexed by i from 1 
to N has revenue per adopter equal to a running royalty multi-
plied by output riq and a lump-sum royalty Ri. Because adopters 
are price takers, each adopter chooses the profit-maximizing out-
put q that equates marginal cost to the market price net of total 
per-unit royalties. The adopter’s supply function depends on the 
price net of total per-unit royalties.152 
 
 151. Each adopter’s marginal cost function C′(q) is increasing in q. If the 
market price is p, the profit maximizing output is such that marginal cost 
equals price, C′(q) = p. This gives the supply function q = S(p). The supply func-
tion S is the inverse of its marginal cost function so the supply function is in-
creasing in the price. 
 152. The profit maximizing output of a producer sets marginal cost equal to 
the price net of total per-unit royalties, 𝑝 − ∑ 𝑟𝑖 = 𝐶′(𝑞)
𝑁
𝑖=1 . This can be rewritten 
as the traditional supply function, which depends on the price net of per-unit 
royalties. 𝑞 = 𝑆(𝑝 − ∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ). 
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Each adopter’s benefit V from the patent license agreements 
equals revenue minus production costs and minus patent license 
royalties.153 If the adopter does not obtain licenses from all of the 
patent holders, the adopter must pursue an alternative oppor-
tunity. The value of the best alternative opportunity is v, which 
is the disagreement payoff for the adopter in bilateral bargain-
ing. The adopter’s net benefit from patent licensing is V – v. 
To simplify the discussion, every patent holder has the same 
bargaining power relative to each adopter. Let A be the relative 
bargaining power of a patent holder. The patent holder’s relative 
bargaining power is a factor that can take any value that is 
greater than zero and less than 100%. The patent holder’s disa-
greement payoff is zero for each bilateral negotiation. If the pa-
tent holder does not form a patent license agreement with a par-
ticular adopter, then the patent holder obtains no royalties from 
that adopter. The analysis would still apply if there was a disa-
greement payoff such as damages for infringement. 
The patent holder and adopter choose royalties to maximize 
their joint benefits and also to divide the joint benefits.154 The 
negotiation framework generates the important conclusion that 
any patent holder and adopter pair will rely exclusively on a 
lump-sum royalty. The negotiating parties will not use a per-
unit royalty because it would distort the adopter’s profit-maxim-
izing output decision. The per-unit royalty is an inefficient way 
of dividing profit. Because negotiation divides profit between the 
parties, they both want the adopter to maximize profit.155 
The per-unit royalty transfers some profit from the adopter 
to the patent holder but decreases profit in the process. To avoid 
the joint loss from decreasing profit, the patent holder and an 
adopter do not have a per-unit royalty. To illustrate this, sup-
pose that there is only one patent holder and one adopter. A roy-
alty per unit of output would decrease the adopter’s output.156 If 
 
 153. This can be written as follows, V = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝐶(𝑞) − ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑞
𝑁
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . 
 154. The standard Nash bargaining outcome maximizes the product of net 
benefits with exponents equal to relative bargaining power, that is,                 (V 
– v)1 – A(riq + Ri)A. 
 155. The bargaining pair chooses an outcome such that one party cannot be 
made better off without making the other party worse off. This efficiency crite-
rion, known as Pareto optimality, is a standard property of economic models of 
bargaining. 
 156. To illustrate this, consider the effect of a per-unit royalty on profit ex-
cluding royalties, which is given by pS(p – r) – C(S(p – r)). The supply function 
equates the net price to marginal cost, p – r = C′(S(p – r)). So, the effect of an 
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there were a royalty r per unit of output, an adopter’s supply 
function would be increasing in the market price net of the per-
unit royalty. Because the supply curve is upward sloping, the 
profit maximizing adopter would choose a lower output S(p – r) 
in response to the imposition of the per-unit royalty. Without a 
per-unit royalty, the supply of output S(p) maximizes profit pq – 
C(q), so that output corresponds to the supply S(p). Royalty pay-
ments aside, the lower output due to a per-unit royalty decreases 
the adopter’s profit in comparison to the profit-maximizing out-
put. So, the bargaining pair would choose a zero per unit royalty. 
This argument holds with multiple patent license agreements. 
None of the bargaining pairs will choose a per-unit royalty. 
The negotiation framework establishes that the parties 
choose a lump-sum royalty that is a share of the adopter’s profit 
net of the value of the best alternative. Negotiation equalizes the 
net benefits of the patent holder and technology adopter 
weighted by relative bargaining powers.157 Because there are no 
per-unit royalties, the adopter’s output choice depends only on 
the market price.158 The adopter’s profit net of the value of the 
best alternative is contingent on the product market price and 
equals pS(p) – C(S(p)) – v. The share of net profit depends on the 
patent holder’s relative bargaining power and the number of pa-
tent holders, A/(1 – A + AN). Because the adopter’s profit is in-
creasing in the market price, the royalty is increasing in the 
market price. The royalty is increasing in the patent holder’s 
bargaining power, decreasing in the value of the best alternative 
opportunity, and decreasing in the number of patent holders.159 
 
increase in the per-unit royalty is [p – C′(S(p – r))]S′(p – r) = – r S′(p – r)). This 
is less than zero because the supply curve is upward sloping. So, a royalty low-
ers profit excluding royalties. Put differently, profit pS(p – r) – C(S(p – r)) is less 
than pS(p) – C(S(p)). 
 157. The standard bargaining solution equalizes the net benefits of the par-
ties weighted by their relative bargaining powers, A(V – v) = (1 – A)(riq + Ri). 
 158. Because lump-sum royalties are equal, the bargaining can be written 
as A(pq – C(q) – NR – v) = (1 – A)R. Solving for the royalty gives R = [A/(1 – A 
+ AN)](pq – C(q) – v). The output is given by the adopter’s supply decision, q = 
S(p). 
 159. The product market demand function is D(p) so that the market-clear-
ing price equates market demand to total supply, D(p) = MS(p). The market 
clearing price does not depend on the number of patent holders, the allocation 
of bargaining power, or royalties. Each adopter has a benefit V that corresponds 
to profit minus royalties pq – C(q) – NR. So, the adopter’s profit minus royalties 
is a weighted average of profit and the value of the best alternative opportunity, 
V = [(1 – A)/(1 – A + AN)](pq – C(q)) + [NA/(1 – A + AN)]v. 
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The negotiation framework gives royalties that are contin-
gent on the realization of the market price. The negotiated out-
come is consistent with a variety of royalty arrangements includ-
ing royalties that are a share of the product price or product 
revenues. The negotiated outcome also is consistent with combi-
nations of equity arrangements, up-front payments, milestones, 
and various other contingent arrangements. The negotiated out-
come is consistent with royalty arrangements that adjust to var-
iations in product market prices. 
Because royalties are a share of the adopter’s profit net of 
the value of the best alternative, it follows that the interests of 
each patent owner and adopter pair are aligned. All of the patent 
holders licensing to a particular adopter prefer that the adopter 
maximize profit. An adopter can bargain with each of the patent 
holders, and all the licensing agreements will be consistent with 
each other. The adopter chooses output to maximize profit by 
equating marginal cost to the market price. Because there are 
no royalties per unit of output, the problem of multiple-margin-
alization does not arise. 
The negotiation framework provides insights into antitrust 
policy debates. The royalties that a monopolist offering a bundle 
of the complementary inventions would choose provides an im-
portant benchmark. For consistency with negotiation, the bun-
dling monopolist takes product market prices as given. The out-
come with negotiation and the outcome with a bundling 
monopolist are comparable. If the bundling monopolist were to 
exercise market power downstream in addition to its market 
power in the market for patent licenses, it would obtain even 
greater royalties and earn more revenues. 
The bundling monopolist can choose a combination consist-
ing of a royalty rM per-unit of output and a lump-sum royalty RM 
for the bundle of patents. As was the case with negotiation, the 
bundling monopolist wishes to choose the per-unit royalty such 
that the adopter has the greatest profit. As before, each pro-
ducer’s supply curve is upward sloping so that a per-unit royalty 
would distort the outcome by decreasing the producer’s output. 
The adopter’s profit is decreasing in the per-unit royalty so that 
the bundling monopolist chooses a zero per-unit royalty. As was 
observed with negotiation, the bundling monopolist avoids using 
a per-unit royalty so that the adopter chooses the output that 
maximizes profit. The bundling monopolist then chooses 
116 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:1 
 
royalties to capture economic rents without diminishing adopter 
profit. 
The bundling monopolist increases the lump-sum royalty to 
the level at which an adopter is indifferent between adopting the 
complementary inventions and choosing the best alternative. 
The bundling monopolist chooses a lump-sum royalty equal to 
the adopter’s profit net of the adopter’s value of the best alterna-
tive. The bundling monopolist chooses a lump-sum royalty RM 
equal to the adopter’s profit contingent on the market price net 
of the value of the best alternative, pS(p) – C(S(p)) – v. 
The discussion establishes that total royalties with bilateral 
negotiation are strictly less than royalties with a bundling mo-
nopolist, NR < RM. This outcome is the reverse of the “Cournot 
Effect.” The bundling monopolist chooses greater royalties than 
the total with negotiation for any rate of cost pass-though less 
than 100%, that is, for any individual adopter supply curve with 
a positive slope. The bundling monopolist chooses greater royal-
ties than the total with negotiation for any patent holder bar-
gaining power that is less than 100%. This conclusion holds for 
any number of patent holders and for any value of the best alter-
native opportunity. The royalties the bundling monopolist 
chooses correspond to a limiting case of the negotiated outcome. 
The bundling monopolist’s royalties corresponds to the limit of 
the total negotiated royalties when the relevant bargaining 
power of each inventor approaches 100%, that is, when A ap-
proaches the limit of 1. 
The negotiation framework presented here has additional 
implications for the economic and legal analysis of patent pools. 
The standard economic model characterizes patent pools as bun-
dling monopolists.160 In practice, however, technology adopters 
and patent holders may have the option of negotiating contracts. 
This suggests that patent pool royalties will not exceed negoti-
ated prices. So, patent pools with this option will have total roy-
alties less than or equal to the negotiated outcome. This implies 
that market negotiation of patent license agreements provides 
an important benchmark for patent pools. The negotiation 
framework presented here then implies that patent pools will 
have total royalties substantially lower than a bundling monop-
olist patent holder. The bundling monopolist is not an accurate 
 
 160. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 41, at 36–38; Spulber, Patent Licensing, 
supra note 138, at 707–08. 
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description of patent pools. This suggests that patent pools serve 
economic functions that differ from regulating royalties. Under 
some market conditions, patent pools serve to mitigate transac-
tion costs and improve coordination among patent holders and 
technology adopters. 
C. ANTITRUST POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NEGOTIATION 
The negotiation framework establishes that complementary 
inventions should not raise antitrust concerns. The parties do 
not rely exclusively on distortionary running royalties. Patent 
holders do not commit to take-it-or-leave-it royalty offers. Both 
patent holders and technology adopters have bargaining power. 
Cost pass-through is not 100%. The negotiated outcome avoids 
multiple marginalizations so that the competitive downstream 
product market will be efficient. Royalty arrangements are con-
tingent on the downstream market price so that they adjust to 
market conditions. Total royalties with negotiation are less than 
those of a bundling monopolist. 
Negotiation of patent license agreements reverses the influ-
ential “Cournot Effect.” The observation that total royalties with 
negotiation are strictly less than those of a bundling monopolist 
(NR < RM) has a number of important implications. Negotiation 
eliminates the basis for predictions of “royalty stacking,” “SEP 
hold-up,” “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” the “Tragedy of 
the Anti-Commons,” and the promotion of “regulatory patent 
pools.” In short, negotiation removes the branches from the 
Cournot tree. 
The negotiation framework is comparable to the Cournot 
model as applied to patent licensing. Both approaches involve 
multiple patent holders and multiple producers that are technol-
ogy adopters. Adopters choose to license patents rather than in-
fringing. The inventions are strict complements, so adopters 
must license all of the patents to engage in production and sup-
ply final products. A patent holder’s entire portfolio of patents 
might contain many different types of technologies and inven-
tions.161 The downstream market is perfectly competitive with 
 
 161. For ease of discussion, suppose that patent owners do not have any li-
censing costs and also do not have any opportunity cost from licensing. The 
analysis of negotiation can readily incorporate these costs. Because all inven-
tions are strict complements to each other, it is not possible to identify the con-
tribution of individual inventions. All of the inventions are necessary for the 
final product and may be considered symmetrically as a consequence. There are 
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price-taking producers. Each producer’s profit equals revenues 
minus production costs. Each producer’s net benefit from adopt-
ing the inventions is profit minus total royalties paid to patent 
holders and minus the value of the best alternative. 
Antitrust policy should not presume that there is a compe-
tition problem in industries with complementary inventions. An-
titrust policy does not need to apply extra scrutiny to industries 
with technology standards and SEPs. Competitive markets with 
negotiation of patent license agreements are sufficient to provide 
the coordination needed for complex innovation. Antitrust policy 
makers should avoid following an overly simplistic “Standards, 
Conduct, Performance” paradigm.162 Technology standards in 
themselves do not imply that there are problems with either 
competitive conduct or economic performance. 
As noted previously, many patent pools provide patent hold-
ers and technology adopters the option of directly negotiating 
patent licenses. Even if this option is not exercised, the potential 
for market negotiation of patent license agreements limits pa-
tent pool royalties. The negotiation framework demonstrates 
that patent pools should not be characterized as bundling mo-
nopolists. This implies that the purpose of the patent pool is not 
to generate excessive revenues through bundling complemen-
tary inventions. 
The negotiation framework suggests that antitrust policy 
markets should not promote patent pools as a means for control-
ling total royalties for complementary inventions. Antitrust pol-
icy should continue to emphasize the beneficial role of patent 
pools as mechanisms for mitigating transaction costs and im-
proving coordination. Antitrust policy makers should maintain 
neutrality, allowing markets to determine the best mix of patent 
pools, intermediaries, and bilateral negotiation. 
The antitrust policy implications of the negotiation frame-
work are robust to very different market conditions. The results 
of the analysis continue to apply for any cost pass-through rate 
ranging from very small to very large percentages. Put differ-
ently, the analysis allows for any producer supply curves that 
 
no other differences between the inventors in terms of patent validity or licens-
ing costs. This means that the inventions can be viewed as symmetric and total 
royalties will be the same for every invention. 
 162. Daniel F. Spulber, Innovation Economics: Technology Standards, Com-
petitive Conduct and Economic Performance, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 777, 778–
79 (2013). 
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are not infinitely elastic. The analysis also continues to apply for 
any patent holder bargaining power ranging from very low to 
very high. The analysis applies for general demand conditions in 
the downstream market. Finally, the negotiation framework 
holds for any numbers of patent holders and producers. 
The perfect complements assumption is a “worst-case sce-
nario.” The perfect complements assumption is standard in dis-
cussions of antitrust policy.163 Inventions are perfect comple-
ments if a particular set of technologies must be used in 
combination to create a specific complex innovation.164 This also 
could occur because the technologies are SEPs declared to SSOs 
that are necessary for producers to implement a technology 
standard. The main conclusions apply if the inventions are sub-
stitutes or imperfect complements, as long as the benefits of us-
ing all of the inventions exceed the benefits of using only some 
of the inventions. This is because negotiation between patent 
holders and technology adopters will choose the optimal mix of 
inventions. If only some of the inventions are needed to create 
complex innovations or to comply with standards, the results ap-
ply to negotiation between active patent holders and technology 
adopters. Also, if there is competition between substitute inven-
tions, this will constrain royalties. The conclusions also extend 
to heterogeneous inventions with each combination of inventions 
having different effects on the adopter’s profit.165 
The antitrust implications of the negotiation framework 
presented here extend to other competitive environments. The 
results still apply if downstream producers engage in imperfect 
competition, and patent holders and producers negotiate over to-
tal royalty payments. When royalties are a share of profits, pro-
ducers that engage in imperfect competition will continue to 
maximize their profits. This is because producers that retain a 
share of profits have the same incentives to maximize profits. 
 
 163. See, e.g., Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 706. 
 164. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100–03; see also Spulber, supra note 41 
(applying perfect complementary models in the downstream market); Spulber, 
Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 706 (applying perfect complementary mod-
els in intellectual property rights). 
 165. See Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 696–97. 
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This observation holds for practically any economic model of mo-
nopolistic competition.166 
Negotiation of patent license agreements may be inefficient 
under some conditions. These conditions are not relevant to the 
present analysis because they would risk violating antitrust pol-
icy. The market equilibrium can be distorted when downstream 
producers engage in imperfect competition and upstream patent 
holders are able to choose royalties and other restrictive contract 
terms that increase prices downstream. Such distortions could 
foster collusion among downstream producers and generate 
higher total royalties. This problem is not unique to patents and 
would apply to any type of vertical restraints involving produc-
tive inputs. 
Patent license agreements that create anticompetitive hori-
zontal or vertical restraints would be ruled out by antitrust pol-
icy. The Antitrust Guidelines state “[t]he Agencies apply the 
same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellec-
tual property that they apply to conduct involving any other 
form of property.”167 The Antitrust Guidelines caution that 
[a] restraint in a licensing arrangement may harm such competition, 
for example, if it facilitates market division or price-fixing. In addition, 
license restrictions with respect to one market may harm such compe-
tition in another market by anticompetitively foreclosing access to, or 
significantly raising the price of, an important input, or by facilitating 
coordination to increase price or reduce output.168 
In particular, the guidelines state “[l]icensing arrangements 
raise concerns under the antitrust laws if they are likely to affect 
adversely the prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods 
and services either currently or potentially available.”169 
III. THE “COURNOT EFFECT” AND PATENT LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS 
This section summarizes the Cournot model and examines 
its application to patent licensing. The Cournot model predicts 
that complementary monopolists will choose input prices greater 
 
 166. See Daniel F. Spulber, Standard Setting Organisations and Standard 
Essential Patents: Voting and Markets, 129 ECON. J. 1477, 1480 (2018) 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12606. 
 167. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 3. 
 168. Id. at 8. 
 169. Id. 
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than the price that a bundling monopolist would choose.170 Ap-
plied to patents, the “Cournot Effect” predicts that the total of 
per-unit royalties chosen by patent holders is greater than what 
a bundling monopolist patent holder would choose.171 This sec-
tion explains why the Cournot model should not apply to patent 
licensing. The section reviews standard discussions of antitrust 
policy toward complementary inventions based on the “Cournot 
Effect.” 
A. THE COURNOT MODEL AND THE “COURNOT EFFECT” 
The Cournot model examines two upstream monopolists 
that supply complementary inputs to downstream producers. 
One complementary monopolist supplies copper and the other 
supplies zinc. The two input monopolists sell to downstream pro-
ducers of brass. The Cournot model assumes that the two inputs 
must be used in fixed proportions to produce a unit of the final 
output. Output cannot be produced without using a particular 
mix of the inputs, so that the inputs are said to be perfect com-
plements in production.172 
Producers of brass have constant unit costs and infinite elas-
ticity of supply. The final product price in the Cournot model 
equals the per-unit prices of the two inputs, copper and zinc, plus 
any other unit costs of producing brass. As a consequence, a $1 
increase in the price of copper or the price of zinc or the sum of 
input prices results in a $1 increase in the price of brass.173 
In the Cournot model, input suppliers make take-it-or-
leave-it price offers to the downstream producers.174 Input sup-
pliers choose their price offers “non-cooperatively.”175 This 
means that the input suppliers make independent price offers 
 
 170. Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monop-
oly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101, 103–04 (1960). 
 171. Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 706–07. 
 172. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100–03; see also Machlup & Taber, supra 
note 170 (surveying the historical literature on Cournot’s work). 
 173. The Cournot complementary monopolies model is as follows. The per-
unit prices are r1 for copper and r2 for zinc. Any other per-unit costs of produc-
tion are constant and equal c. The equilibrium is obtained as follows. The mar-
ket demand for brass is Q = D(P), where Q is the total market output of brass 
and P is the price of brass. The elasticity of supply is infinite so that the final 
output price is P = r1 + r2 + c. This is the horizontal industry supply curve that 
generates 100% cost pass-through. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100–03. 
 174. Id. at 99. 
 175. Id. 
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without knowledge of the negative effects of their price offers on 
other input suppliers. An input supplier makes a price offer that 
is a profit-maximizing best response to what each supplier be-
lieves will be the offer of the other producer. 
The Cournot model assumes that the downstream market 
for brass is perfectly competitive. Implicitly, there are many 
small downstream producers of brass. Those producers take the 
market price of brass as a given and do not believe that their 
output could affect the price of output. The small downstream 
producers also take the prices of the two inputs as given. The 
producers do not believe that their input demand could affect the 
prices of either of the two inputs. Downstream producers have 
constant unit costs of production so that they have an infinite 
elasticity of supply. The market price of the downstream output 
exactly equals the total of the input prices plus any other unit 
costs of producers. 
The input suppliers face a “free rider” problem because they 
do not coordinate their “take-it-or-leave-it” price offers. A com-
plementary input monopolist does not recognize that an increase 
in its input price will lower the revenues of the other input mo-
nopolist. Both increase their prices such that the total is greater 
than what they would choose by coordinating their actions. This 
implies that the total of prices is greater than what a bundling 
monopolist would choose. The input monopolists do not attain 
the joint profit maximum. “[T]he composite commodity will al-
ways be made more expensive, by reason of separation of inter-
ests than by reason of the fusion of monopolies.”176 
The Cournot model suffers from an inconsistency in its as-
sumptions. Downstream producers take the product price as 
given but upstream input suppliers do not. Upstream input sup-
pliers are able to affect the downstream product price by control-
ling input prices. It seems unlikely that input suppliers have 
market power in product markets when producers have no mar-
ket power in product markets. 
 
 176. Id. at 103 observing, “An association of monopolists, working for their 
own interest, in this instance will also work for the interest of consumers, which 
is exactly the opposite of what happens with competing producers.” Id. 
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B.  THE COURNOT MODEL AND PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
Antitrust policy recommendations in economics and law of-
ten are based on the Cournot model.177 Such antitrust policy pre-
scriptions illustrate the fallacy of overgeneralization or jumping 
to conclusions.178 The hypothetical inefficiencies in Cournot’s 
model of complementary monopolies do not imply that comple-
mentarities always have such effects.179 The special conditions 
set forth in Cournot’s complementary monopolies model do not 
apply to patents. Under more realistic assumptions about mar-
ket conditions, complementary patents do not cause the 
“Cournot Effect.” 
Economic and legal studies that apply the Cournot model to 
patent licensing make a number of assumptions that do not con-
form to institutions in the market for patent licenses. These as-
sumptions are contrary to negotiation of patent license agree-
ments between patent holders and technology adopters. 
Applications of the Cournot model to patents assume that 
patent holders are price makers, offering royalties using “take-
it-or-leave-it” pricing, and technology adopters are price tak-
ers.180 Patent holders are able to exercise indirect market power 
in a vertically distinct market. Patent holders have all market 
power in upstream technology markets and technology adopters 
have no countervailing market power. There are no viable sub-
stitute technologies that could compete with the complementary 
technologies. Technology adopters do not add value because they 
do not provide their own assets, capabilities, or technologies. 
 
 177. Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Econom-
ics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 635 (2010) (“Double margin-
alization problems occur in both vertically related markets and markets for 
complements. The latter the situation is sometimes referred to as the ‘Cournot 
complements’ problem, but the fundamental analysis is the same.”). 
 178. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC (10th ed. 
2007). See generally Hans Hansen, Fallacies, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2019/entries/fallacies/ (explaining fallacies generally). 
 179. The “Cournot Effect” fallacy is not a criticism of Cournot’s complemen-
tary monopolies model, but rather of its application in situations with different 
conditions. 
 180. Saul H. Hymans, The Price-Taker: Uncertainty, Utility, and the Supply 
Function,7 INT’L ECON. REV. 346, 347 (1966) (describing a firm that accepts a 
given price as a “price-taker”); John Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, Optimal Sell-
ing Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm, 98 Q. J. ECON. 267, 267 
(1983) (“A seller encountering risk-neutral buyers one at a time should, if com-
mitments are feasible, quote a single take-it-or-leave-it price to each.”). 
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Patent holders control the final product price and producers 
have no control over the final product price. 
Applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing are 
extensions of Arrow’s classic model.181 In Arrow’s framework, a 
monopoly inventor offers licenses to a competitive product mar-
ket in which producers have an infinite elasticity of supply.182 
The monopoly inventor chooses a running royalty that is con-
stant per unit of output.183 The monopoly inventor chooses the 
per-unit royalty such that the equilibrium in the product market 
corresponds to a product market monopoly.184 This analysis im-
plies that patent royalties generate the standard deadweight 
welfare loss due to monopoly. Nordhaus applies Arrow’s model 
to the question of what should be the optimal patent life.185 Be-
cause royalties are distortionary, Nordhaus concludes that pa-
tent life should be just long enough to cover the costs of research 
and development.186 
The Cournot approach misses the complexities involved in 
transferring and adopting technologies. Because the Cournot 
model simply involves price announcements, it follows that ap-
plications of the Cournot model to patent licensing assume that 
technology transfers are spot market transactions rather than 
contractual transactions. The spot market approach to patent li-
censing fails to recognize that technology transfers and adoption 
unfold over time. The spot market approach misses the complex-
ity of contracting for technology transfers. Unlike basic produc-
tive inputs, technology transfers often are bundled with 
knowledge transfers and complementary goods and services. 
Bundling of knowledge, goods, and services requires contractual 
agreements. 
The Cournot model, as applied to patents, represents tech-
nology transfers as basic inputs such as copper and zinc, which 
 
 181. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1962). 
 182. Id. at 619–22. 
 183. Id. at 619. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A 
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969) [hereinafter 
NORDHAUS, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE]; see also William D. Nordhaus, The Op-
timum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 428–31 (1972) [hereinafter 
Nordhaus, Patent Life]. 
 186. Nordhaus, Patent Life supra note 185, at 430–31. 
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are divisible and depletable.187 Producers use up these inputs in 
producing brass.188 According to this view, patent holders pro-
vide access to technology in return for royalties that are constant 
per unit of output.189 Unlike such basic inputs, however, technol-
ogy transfers are indivisible and non-rivalrous. There is no need 
for metered pricing to ration usage. 
An anomaly in applications of the Cournot model to patent 
licensing is that input prices and royalties apply to very different 
things. In the Cournot model, input prices are based on the num-
ber of units of those inputs, e.g. the weight of copper and of 
zinc.190 When applying the Cournot model to patent licensing ap-
plications, royalties are based on the number of units of output 
of producers using the patents. This would be equivalent to pric-
ing copper and zinc based on the weight of brass. When the rela-
tionship of inputs to outputs can vary, as in the relationship be-
tween patents as inputs and output of products, the Cournot 
approach will be misleading. 
Applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing re-
strict royalties to running royalties that are constant per unit of 
output.191 Such royalties can cause price distortions from double 
marginalization and deadweight welfare losses.192 Restricting 
royalties to constant charges per unit of output overstates the 
effects of royalties on product prices. So, royalties that are con-
stant per unit of output overstate the effects of complementary 
inventions on product prices. Relying only on such royalties 
means that all economic transfers from technology adopters to 
patent holders are distortionary. In contrast, lump-sum royal-
ties and various revenue and profit-sharing royalty arrange-
ments mitigate or avoid such distortionary effects. 
Applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing typi-
cally do not consider the complexities of patent license 
 
 187. See, e.g., COURNOT supra note 26, at 100 (using copper and zinc as in-
puts). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Spulber, supra note 44, at 678 (“If running royalties are specific, run-
ning royalties consist of a royalty r multiplied by the number of units sold Q.”) 
 192. See, e.g., id. (stating that using lump-sum royalties instead would be a 
way to avoid the “distortionary effects of double marginalization” caused by run-
ning royalties). 
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agreements.193 Running royalties that are constant per unit of 
output do not adjust to changes in output prices and revenues. 
This approach ignores the many types of contingent royalty ar-
rangements such a profit sharing. Contingent royalty arrange-
ments offer risk sharing to patent holders and technology 
adopters.194 Contingent royalties serve to provide incentives for 
performance and sharing of information that addresses moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems.195 
The Cournot model assumes that patent holders have all 
market power in downstream product markets.196 Technology 
adopters and final customers have no market power in down-
stream product markets. Input suppliers to downstream produc-
ers have no market power. Downstream products are homogene-
ous so that there are no substitute products in downstream 
product markets.197 Simply by choosing patent royalties, patent 
holders fully control prices in downstream product markets. Fi-
nally, patent holders behave non-cooperatively and free-rider ef-
fects generate distortions in total royalties.198 
 
 193. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 44, at 696 (observing that the “Cournot 
Effect” does not apply to patent license agreements). 
 194. See generally Hayne E. Leland, Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing 
of Natural Resources, with Applications to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS, 92 
Q. J. ECON. 413 (1978) (modeling royalty payments as risk-sharing between par-
ties to a transaction). 
 195. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The 
Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 241 (2001) (“A lump-
sum payment provides no incentive for the inventor to expend further effort in 
development . . . royalties solve this moral-hazard problem by linking the in-
ventor’s license income to additional effort.”); Emmanuel Dechenaux, Jerry 
Thursby, & Marie Thursby, Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The 
Role of Contracts, 40 RES. POL’Y 94, 94 (2011) (“[T]o the extent that faculty in-
ventors prefer to solve new puzzles rather than develop existing inventions, ob-
taining cooperation requires financial incentives tied to development.”); Daniela 
Marinescu & Dumitru Marin, Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selec-
tion and Informational Rents, 6 THEORETICAL & APPLIED ECON. 27, 40–43 
(2011) (analyzing how to optimize contingent-royalty contracts to best align in-
centives). 
 196. See generally Spulber, supra note 44, at 696 (discussing the assumption 
that input monopolists, here patent holders, announce prices they will charge 
to downstream producers). 
 197. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100. 
 198. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 44 at 696 (discussing one way to eliminate 
the “free rider problem”). 
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C.  THE COURNOT MODEL AND COST PASS-THROUGH 
The Cournot model assumes that individual producers have 
constant unit costs consisting of production costs and per-unit 
royalties.199 This means that producers have an infinite elastic-
ity of supply and the aggregate supply function also is infinitely 
elastic. The market price equals unit production costs plus total 
per-unit royalties.200 This means that there is 100% pass-
through of royalties to the final product price. Royalties are a 
constant amount per unit of output so per unit royalties are 
passed on fully to consumers of the final product. 
In most markets, individual producers have upward sloping 
supply curves.201 The rate of cost pass-through is between zero 
and 100%, where a cost pass-through rate of less than one is said 
to be incomplete and a cost pass-through rate equal to one is said 
to be complete.202 In the basic competitive market model with 
upward-sloping supply, the rate of cost pass-through is incom-
plete. The classic formula for cost pass-through in a competitive 
market is 1/(1 + ED/ES), where ED is the elasticity of demand and 
ES is the elasticity of supply.203 The Cournot model assumes that 
the product market has a downward sloping demand so that the 
elasticity of demand is positive.204 The Cournot model further 
assumes that the product market supply is infinitely elastic—
that is, the supply curve is a horizontal line.205 With a positive 
elasticity of demand and infinitely elastic supply, the cost pass-
through rate is 100%.206 Any price responsiveness in supply—
 
 199. See COURNOT, supra note 26 at 100. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Alexei Alexandrov & Sergei Koulayev, Using the Economics of the Pass-
Through in Proving Antitrust Injury in Robinson-Patman Cases, 60 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 345 (2015). 
 202. See id. at 352 (showing that a cost pass-through of greater than 100% 
is inconsistent with the terminology because it would indicate a greater price 
reaction than the cost increase, while acknowledging that cost increases may 
trigger various price increases); see also Alexei Alexandrov, Pass-Through Rates 
in the Real World: The Effect of Price Points and Menu Costs, 79 ANTITRUST L. 
J. 349 (2013). 
 203. See Henry Charles Fleeming Jenkin, On the Principles Which Regulate 
the Incidence of Taxes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH 
618, 631 (1871). 
 204. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 44–46. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 108. 
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that is, an upward sloping supply curve—would decrease the 
cost pass-through rate below 100%.207 
The rate of cost pass-through generally is incomplete in 
market models with imperfect competition.208 This can be illus-
trated by considering a downstream monopolist. The reasoning 
is similar with imperfect competition downstream. If the down-
stream producer is a monopolist with constant unit costs, an in-
crease in costs will generate a change in the price equal to the 
ratio of the slope of the demand curve to the slope of the marginal 
revenue curve.209 This is because a monopolist maximizes profit 
by equating marginal revenue to marginal cost. Any increase in 
cost will cause the monopolist to adjust their price to keep mar-
ginal revenue equal to cost, so the cost increase is passed 
through to marginal revenue, but not to price. The monopolist’s 
amount of cost pass-through is necessarily less than one, be-
cause the slope of the demand curve is greater than the slope of 
the marginal revenue curve. The slope of the demand curve is 
greater than that of the marginal revenue curve because average 
revenue is greater than marginal revenue. Put differently, the 
monopolist’s marginal revenue is always less than price because 
selling one more unit requires lowering the price. 
The extreme assumption of 100% cost pass-through does not 
apply to most markets. Empirical studies demonstrate that cost-
pass through tends to be very incomplete.210 As Bonnet et al. ob-
serve, “[a] large theoretical and growing empirical literature ex-
plains what could be contributing to incomplete retail price 
transmission of upstream cost, shocks, or incomplete transmis-
sion of exchange rate shocks into countries’ domestic consumer 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Pfleiderer, A Note on the Effect of Cost 
Changes on Prices, 91 J. POL. ECON. 182–85 (1983); see also E.G. Weyl & M. 
Fabinger, Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence Under Im-
perfect Competition, 121 J. POL. ECON. 528 (2013). 
 209. Bulow & Pfleiderer, supra note 208, at 183 (explaining that “for a given 
increase in marginal cost, the monopolist will contract output so that marginal 
revenue increases by the same amount, causing the price to rise by an amount 
equal to the ratio of the slope of the demand curve to the slope of the marginal 
revenue curve times the amount of the cost change”). 
 210. See, e.g., Celine Bonnet et al, Empirical Evidence on the Role of Non-
linear Wholesale Pricing and Vertical Restraints on Cost Pass-Through, 95 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 500, 562 (2013) (explaining incomplete pass-through rates in the 
German coffee market). 
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retail prices.”211 Hellerstein and Villas-Boas observe that micro-
economic and industrial organization studies “provide possible 
mechanisms for formalizing the reasons that price does not 
equal costs and thus for why changes in costs may not be passed 
through into prices.”212 Many studies of cost pass-through based 
on currency exchange rates find that prices are not responsive to 
changes in exchange rates.213 According to one survey, “incom-
plete pass-through is a common and pervasive phenomenon 
across a broad range of countries.”214 Brun-Aguerre et al. find 
that the short-run and the long-run exchange rate pass-through 
elasticities for the US “appear to be at the low-end of the spec-
trum for [developed markets] in line with previous studies.”215 
The rate of cost pass-through for excise taxes is higher in some 
retail markets but this may be due to slim margins in retail and 
uniformity in pricing.216 
 
 211. Id. at 500; see also José Manuel Campa & Linda S. Goldberg, Exchange 
Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 679, 682 (2005). 
 212. Rebecca Hellerstein & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Outsourcing and Pass-
Through, 81 J. INT’L ECON. 170, 171 (2010). 
 213. Charles Engel, Expenditure Switching and Exchange-Rate Policy, 17 
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 231, 268 (2002) (stating “consumer prices are not 
very responsive to exchange rates”). 
 214. Jayant Menon, Exchange Rate Pass‐Through, 9 J. ECON. SURV. 197, 
224 (1995). 
 215. Raphael Brun-Aguerre, Ana-Maria Fuertes, & Kate Phylaktis, Ex-
change Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices Revisited: What Drives it?, 31 J. 
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 818, 825 (2012); see also Janine Aron, Ronald Macdonald 
& John Muellbauer, Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Developing and Emerging 
Markets: A Survey of Conceptual, Methodological and Policy Issues, and Se-
lected Empirical Findings, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 101, 136 (asserting that micro-data 
studies for industrial countries on exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) find that 
“[h]eterogeneous ERPT estimates are typically reported at the sectoral and 
goods levels, and ERPT is delayed and incomplete for imports and both retail 
and wholesale domestic prices”); Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Michael M. 
Knetter, Goods, Prices, and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?, 35 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1243 (1997); Jiawen Yang, Exchange Rate Pass-Through in 
U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 79 REV. ECON. & STAT. 95, 95 (1997). 
 216. See Alberto Cavallo, More Amazon Effects: Online Competition and 
Pricing Behaviors (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25138, 2018); 
see also Gunter J. Hitsch, Ali Hortacsu, & Xiliang Lin, Prices and Promotions 
in U.S. Retail Markets: Evidence from Big Data 17–18 (Nat. Bureau of Econ. 
Res. Working Paper 26306, 2019); Stefano DellaVigna & Matthew Gentzkow, 
Uniform Pricing in U.S. Retail Chains, 1, 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Work-
ing Paper No. 23996, 2019) (explaining the uniform pricing puzzle in retail); 
Tuomas Kosonen & Riikka Savolainen, A Case for Aero Effect of Sin Taxes on 
Consumption? Evidence from a Sweets Tax Reform (June 6, 2019) (unpublished 
article) (on file with the National Tax Association) (showing a high rate of pass-
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IV.  ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD PATENT LICENSING 
This section explores the implications of market negotiation 
for antitrust policy toward patent licensing. Negotiation of pa-
tent license agreements allows both patent holders and technol-
ogy adopters to share in the benefits of technology transfers. A 
more accurate view of market institutions and market outcomes 
should help avoid the significant economic and legal costs of mis-
guided antitrust policies. Hypothetical predictions based on the 
“Cournot Effect” have generated antitrust scrutiny, regulatory 
interventions, and many court decisions.217 These policy cures 
can be much worse than the imagined disease. The result is an-
titrust policies that impede competitive conduct, discourage in-
vention and innovation, and weaken protections for IP rights. 
Antitrust policies based on inaccurate descriptions of market in-
stitutions and market outcomes would adversely impact the rate 
and direction of technological change. 
A.  “ROYALTY STACKING” 
“Royalty stacking” refers to the possibility that patent hold-
ers with complementary inventions will choose total royalties 
that exceed the royalties that would be chosen by a bundling mo-
nopoly patent holder. The “royalty stacking” concern is simply a 
restatement of the “Cournot Effect” in terms of royalties per unit 
of output. The “royalty stacking” concern is just the multiple 
marginalization problem described by Cournot.218 
 
through of excise taxes in retail); R. Andrew Butters, Daniel W. Sacks, & 
Boyoung Seo, How do National Firms Respond to Local Shocks? Evidence from 
Excise Taxes (Sept. 11, 2020) (unpublished article) (on file with the National 
Bureau of Economic Research); Etienne Gagnon & David Lopez-Salido, Small 
Price Responses to Large Demand Shocks, 18 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 792, 794 
(2019). 
 217. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (discussing “royalty stacking”); Ericsson, 
Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Unwired Planet 
Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (same). 
 218. Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & Jorge Padilla, The Comple-
ments Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty 
Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 148 (2008); Damien Geradin & M. 
Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking, and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPE-
TITION J. 101, 122 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the 
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and 
Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008); see Einar Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and 
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The issue of “royalty stacking” arises as a possibility in var-
ious legal cases, yet without any evidence. For example, Ericsson 
v. D-Link states that “[r]oyalty stacking can arise when a stand-
ard implicates numerous patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thou-
sands. If companies are forced to pay royalties to all SEP hold-
ers, the royalties will ‘stack’ on top of each other and may become 
excessive in the aggregate.”219 Huawei v. ZTE cites the European 
Commission:  
[a]ccording to the Commission, ‘hold-up is exacerbated where a large 
number of SEPs, covering various standards, are applied to a single 
product. In such circumstances, the number of potential licensors may 
cause the combined royalty payments made to the various SEP-holders 
to become excessive. This phenomenon is known as ‘royalty stack-
ing.’220 
Negotiation of patent license agreements in a competitive 
market is sufficient to avoid the problem of “royalty stacking.” 
Patent royalties involve more than constant charges per unit of 
output.221 Royalties may be contingent on prices, revenues, or 
profits.222 The negotiation framework shows that with bilateral 
negotiation, patent holders and technology adopters will avoid 
royalties that are constant per unit of output and will rely in-
stead on contingent royalties. This framework further shows 
that a bundling monopolist will avoid royalties that are constant 
per unit of output, relying instead on contingent royalties. 
Negotiation in a competitive market avoids “royalty stack-
ing” because the total share of producer profit, net of the value 
of the best alternative, will be lower with negotiation than with 
a bundling monopoly patent holder. So, total royalties will be 
lower with negotiation than with a bundling monopoly patent 
holder. With negotiation, each pairing of patent holder and tech-
nology adopter chooses royalties as a best response to the royal-
ties they anticipate the adopter will pay other patent holders. 
This important institutional feature of negotiation avoids the 
free-rider effects associated with take-it-or-leave-it pricing. So, 
 
Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 535, 566 (2008) (critically discussing these issues). 
 219. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209. 
 220. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp., 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391 n.14 (November 20, 2014). 
 221. See generally Goldscheider, supra note 80 (discussing the nature and 
calculation of patent royalties as a whole). 
 222. Id. 
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negotiation is sufficient to lower royalties below the bundling 
monopoly level. 
“Royalty stacking” concerns should not drive antitrust pol-
icy or legal decisions. Because most patent license agreements 
are negotiated, hypothetical predictions of “royalty stacking” 
based on the “Cournot Effect” are invalid. In addition, evidence 
shows that the predictions of “royalty stacking” are highly inac-
curate.223 For example, in mobile telecommunications, it is esti-
mated that royalties make up around 5 per cent of mobile hand-
set revenues and less than 2 per cent of total of handset revenues 
and mobile telecommunications operator revenues.224 The high 
profitability of handset producers and mobile telecommunica-
tions operators further suggests that predictions of “royalty 
stacking” are incorrect.225 
Markets for patent license agreements in industries with 
technology standards refute predictions of market failure with 
complementary inventions. The market for mobile wireless prod-
ucts is an important example because mobile phone handsets in-
clude many complementary inventions. Royalties for patent li-
cense agreements involving mobile phones have been 
contentious issues for multiple generations of technology stand-
ards, 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G.226 Stasik writes: 
 
 223. See, e.g. Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty Payments 
No More Than Around 5% of Mobile Handset Revenues, WISEHARBOR (Aug. 19, 
2015, 7:59 PM) (“Vested interests including leaders at the mobile operator dom-
inated NGMN Alliance1 promote the notion that patent licensing fee rates are 
‘perceived’ to be too high in mobile technologies; but without substantiation for 
such claims . . . . [sometimes] based on theories of hold-up and royalty stacking 
that lack empirical support . . . ”). 
 224. See id. (“As a percentage of all consumer charges, including handset 
costs and $1.13 trillion in mobile operator services, which are also highly de-
pendent on SEP technologies, the cumulative royalty yield shrinks to 1.3 per-
cent.”). 
 225. See Keith Mallinson, Don’t Fix What Isn’t Broken: The Extraordinary 
Record of Innovation and Success in the Cellular Industry Under Existing Li-
censing Practices, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967, 968 (2016) (“This Article argues 
that the enormous value produced by patented technologies—as compared to 
the relatively low costs to producers of obtaining that technology—enables the 
explosion of innovation and market development occurring around the world, 
indicating that patent royalties are far from excessive.”). 
 226. See Stasik, supra note 76, at 114–19 (providing an overview of current 
issues in establishing royalty rates through the lens of LTE); see also LARRY 
GOLDSTEIN & BRIAN KEARSEY, TECHNOLOGY PATENT LICENSING: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL REFERENCE ON 21ST CENTURY PATENT LICENSING, PATENT POOLS, AND 
PATENT PLATFORMS (2004). For a discussion of 5G technology standards, see 
e.g., INS. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS., IEEE 5G AND BEYOND TECHNOLOGY 
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Like a sequel to a successful movie, LTE includes many elements of the 
original release and offers a few new twists. This is especially true 
when it comes to the matter of licensing essential IPRs for the LTE 
standard. Audiences can expect to see the same licensing challenges 
that first appeared in GSM (2G) and which re-appeared in UMTS (3G) 
starring again in LTE (4G). The plot is essentially the same: lots of 
essential patents and many different patent holders.227 
In mobile telecommunications, profit margins have re-
mained stable, the quality and variety of consumer devices has 
increased rapidly, and average prices of smartphones have fallen 
while quality and functionality have increased.228 
Empirical evidence shows that companies at various levels 
of the value chain have market power in industries with technol-
ogy standards.229 This fully refutes the notion that patent own-
ers have complete or even significant market power, as sug-
gested by applications of the Cournot model to SEP licensing. 
The telecommunications industry has evolved from full vertical 
integration to a value chain with considerable outsourcing, and 
then to a complex value network with many important play-
ers.230 
In mobile communications, carriers, handset manufactur-
ers, and various component and parts suppliers have market 
power.231 As Jason Dedrick et al. find, “carriers capture the 
greatest value (in terms of gross profit) from each handset, fol-
lowed closely by handset makers, with suppliers a distant 
third . . . [h]owever, the situation is reversed in terms of 
 
ROADMAP WHITE PAPER (2017), https://futurenetworks.ieee.org/im-
ages/files/pdf/ieee-5g-roadmap-white-paper.pdf. 
 227. Stasik, supra note 76, at 114. 
 228. See Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile 
Wireless Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 891, 893, 895 (2015) (analyzing 
each level of the mobile wireless industry to conclude that consistent profit mar-
gins, growth in consumer products, and decreasing average smartphone prices 
all point to a thriving, competitive industry.). 
 229. Id. at 891 (“[F]irms in the mobile wireless industry do not display any 
first-order indication of competitive harm from patent hold-up or royalty stack-
ing.”). 
 230. See Feng Li & Jason Whalley, Deconstruction of the Telecommunica-
tions Industry: From Value Chain to Value Networks, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 451 
(2002) (providing an overview and analysis of the rapidly evolving telecommu-
nications industry, with specific focus on increasing complexities in the value 
chain). 
 231. See, e.g., Upender Subramanian, Jagmohan S. Raju & Z. John Zhang, 
Exclusive Handset Arrangements in the Wireless Industry: A Competitive Anal-
ysis, 32 MARKETING SCI. 246 (2013) (discussing negotiation between carriers 
and handset providers, with focus on exclusive arrangements). 
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operating profit.”232 Dedrick et al. show that “[c]ompanies at all 
levels of the supply chain compete with rivals for market share 
and profits and negotiate with their suppliers and customers to 
appropriate more of the profits from innovation.”233 Patent hold-
ers are only one set of players in a complex industry value net-
work that also consists of the carriers, handset manufacturers, 
and suppliers. 
B.  “STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT HOLDUP” 
Negotiation between technology adopters and patent hold-
ers helps realize the benefits of technology standards. “SEP 
holdup” provides an inaccurate characterization of patent li-
cense negotiation. “SEP holdup” should not be used to guide ei-
ther antitrust policy or court decisions. Studies of “SEP holdup” 
provide very weak evidence of either patent holdup or royalty 
stacking.234 
i. “SEP Holdup” and the “Cournot Effect” 
“SEP holdup” alleges that complementary inventions create 
problems in industries with technology standards.235 On the ba-
sis of “SEP holdup,” there are calls for industries to turn back 
the clock so that technology adopters and patent holders negoti-
ate patent license agreements before standardization.236 The 
 
 232. Jason Dedrick, Kenneth L. Kraemer & Greg Linden, The Distribution 
of Value in the Mobile Phone Supply Chain, 35 TELECOMM. POL’Y 505, 505 
(2011). 
 233. Id. at 517. 
 234. See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpret-
ing eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. 
COMP. L. & ECON. 571, 600 (2008) (“Taking all of the evidence together, we find 
the proof of prevalent, recurring patent holdup, and royalty stacking in high-
tech industries to be extremely weak.”). 
 235. See id. at 573 (“According to the holdup argument, once a manufacturer 
has invested in a plant and equipment to produce a particular good, the firms 
with patents relevant for that good can ask for and receive more than their fair 
share of the profits, since the manufacturer risks losing its entire investment if 
it cannot obtain a license to the patent.”); Farrell et al., supra note 31 (providing 
an overview of patent holdup and standardization issues); Melamed & Shapiro, 
supra note 31, at 2111 (“Without some checks, SEP owners could opportunisti-
cally engage in patent holdup, taking advantage of the fact that the firms and 
users adopting the standard become individually and collectively locked in to 
the standard over time.”). 
 236. See Farrell et al., supra note 31, at 621 (“[A]llowing hold-up is a costly 
way to provide rents to patent holders. For instance, users fearing patent am-
bush would have an incentive to . . . insist on ex ante negotiation.”). 
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“SEP holdup” concern also motivates recommendations for 
weakening IP rights, including limits on injunctions.237 
The concept of “SEP holdup” combines the effects of stand-
ardization on negotiation and “royalty stacking.” In Ericsson v. 
D-Link, the court notes both concepts as potentially problematic 
for standard adoption, asserting that “patent hold-up exists 
when the holder of an SEP demands excessive royalties after 
companies are locked into using a standard.”238 Huawei v. ZTE 
identifies injunctions as a cause of excessive royalties:  
[a]ccording to the referring court, SEP-holders are in a powerful posi-
tion when negotiating licences [sic] because of their right to bring an 
action for a prohibitory injunction. Consequently, it should be ensured 
that SEP-holders cannot, for example, impose excessive royalties in 
breach of their commitment to grant licences [sic] on FRAND terms, 
thereby engaging in conduct which has become known as ‘patent hold-
up.’239  
Unwired v. Huawei, in contrast, finds that FRAND commit-
ments are sufficient to address holdup.240 
The concept of “SEP holdup” is based on contradictory argu-
ments because patent holders are said to both negotiate and not 
to negotiate.241 This concept applies two economic models with 
assumptions that are inconsistent with each other. “SEP holdup” 
asserts that patent holders take advantage of adopters in nego-
tiation after technology standards are developed.242 The argu-
ment is that adopters are “locked in” to a technology and 
 
 237. Id. at 610 (noting that potential patent reforms in response to holdup 
concerns could include “in some cases limiting patent holders’ ability to obtain 
injunctions”). 
 238. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1208. 
 239. C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp., 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391477 ¶ 41 (November 20, 2014). 
 240. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. [2017] 
EWHC 711 (Pat), at 155 (“An appropriate way to determine a FRAND royalty 
is to determine a benchmark rate which is governed by the value of the pa-
tentee’s portfolio. That will be fair, reasonable and generally non-discrimina-
tory. The rate does not vary depending on the size of the licensee. It will elimi-
nate hold-up and hold-out. Small new entrants are entitled to pay a royalty 
based on the same benchmark as established large entities.”). 
 241. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30 (analyzing patent holdup and royalty 
stacking with two models: a model with bilateral negotiation and a variant of 
the Cournot model, which assumes royalties that are per unit of output and 
100% cost pass-through). The downstream producer is a monopolist, however, 
which would suggest that patent holders would not choose royalties that are 
constant per unit of output. Id. 
 242. See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 2111. 
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therefore pay higher royalties than they would before standard-
ization.243 At the same time, however, “SEP holdup” asserts that 
patent holders collectively engage in “royalty stacking” by set-
ting royalty rates without negotiation.244 “SEP holdup” con-
cludes that “royalty stacking” due to the “Cournot Effect” mag-
nifies the effects of technology standards on negotiation.245 
The negotiation framework presented here is useful in un-
tangling these inconsistent aspects of the “SEP holdup” argu-
ment. Because most patent license agreements are negotiated, 
including those involving SEPs, it is inconsistent to assert that 
alleged “royalty stacking” based on the “Cournot Effect” will oc-
cur. Although there may be many SEPs in industries with tech-
nology standards, the number of complementary patents does 
not in itself indicate a problem. Negotiation takes into account 
the royalties in other patent license agreements so that total roy-
alties for SEPs do not exceed what a bundling monopolist would 
choose. Contrary to “SEP holdup,” “royalty stacking” does not 
magnify the effects of technology standards. 
The remaining question raised by “SEP holdup” is how 
standardization affects negotiation between patent holders and 
technology adopters. “SEP holdup” suggests that standardiza-
tion removes technological options in comparison to what might 
have existed before standardization. This is an example of the 
problem identified by Demsetz of comparing existing market in-
stitutions to some hypothetical ideal norm.246 
 
 243. Id. (“Put simply: without some checks, SEP owners could opportunisti-
cally engage in patent holdup, taking advantage of the fact that the firms and 
users adopting the standard become individually and collectively locked in to 
the standard over time.”). 
 244. Id. at 2114 (“[A]s a practical matter, patent holders are generally able 
to recover more than the ex ante [negotiated] value of the patent when litigation 
occurs after the implementers are locked in.”). 
 245. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 128 (“The need to solve the complements 
problem tends to be especially great in the context of standard setting.”); Lemley 
& Shapiro, supra note 30, at 1993 (“As a matter of simple arithmetic, royalty 
stacking magnifies the problems associated with injunction threats and holdup, 
and greatly so if many patents read on the same product. In this key sense, the 
problems of injunction threats and royalty stacking are intertwined . . . . 
[T]hese added problems result from simple arithmetic: the combined royalty 
rate owed to all of the patent holders asserting infringement is equal to the sum 
of the royalties owed to each individual patent holder.”); see also Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 31, at 2007–08 (discussing the Cournot Effect and royalty 
stacking generally). 
 246. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. 
L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy 
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“SEP holdup” chooses a benchmark for negotiation based on 
technology standards that were never chosen by a standards or-
ganization. Such a benchmark would reflect hypothetical tech-
nologies that were never fully developed if they existed at all. 
This benchmark would never arise in market negotiation. Policy 
concerns should not be based on imaginary technologies that 
never existed. Negotiating patent licenses before choosing tech-
nology standards or even before developing alternative technol-
ogies would compare actual patent license negotiation to an im-
possible ideal. 
ii. Negotiation and technology standards 
The negotiation framework presented here shows that roy-
alties and the benefits of adopters critically depend on two 
things: the profit obtained from applying standardized technol-
ogy and the value of the best alternative technology. This section 
will show that technology standards increase both adopter profit 
and the value of the best alternative. With negotiation of patent 
license agreements, technology standards make adopters better 
off. 
Negotiation of patent license agreements between technol-
ogy adopters and patent holders makes a number of important 
contributions to standardization. First, negotiation allows tech-
nology adopters and patent holders to share the economic bene-
fits of standardization, with neither side taking unfair ad-
vantage of the other.247 Second, negotiation allows technology 
adopters and patent holders to avoid distortionary royalties and 
to design patent license agreements that maximize joint re-
turns.248 Third, simultaneous bilateral negotiation helps tech-
nology adopters and patent holders achieve multilateral coordi-
nation. Fourth, negotiation of patent license agreements that 
takes place after standardization allows technology adopters 
and patent holders to adapt to technological change.249 Finally, 
anticipation of negotiation of patent license agreements gives 
 
economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and 
an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement.”). 
 247. See Spulber, supra note 120 (broadly covering the advantages of nego-
tiation). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
138 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:1 
 
incentives to technology adopters and patent holders to choose 
efficient technology standards in standards organizations.250 
Technology standards established through voluntary organ-
izations make adopters better off in comparison to markets with-
out technology standards. This is evidenced by the extensive par-
ticipation of adopters in the standards development process, 
which can be costly and time consuming.251 Also, new or revised 
technology standards increase the net benefits to adopters in 
comparison to previous technology standards, as evidenced by 
the widespread adoption of standardized technologies in the 
market.252 Technology adopters benefit from negotiation that 
takes place after developing and promoting technology stand-
ards. This observation is confirmed by the fact that technology 
adopters and patent holders almost always choose to negotiate 
patent license agreements after a process of technological 
change and technology standardization.253 
Consider first the effects of the value of the best alternative 
to adopters. The value of the best alternative is the adopter’s dis-
agreement payoff in negotiation. All other things being equal, 
negotiation implies that royalties are decreasing in the adopter’s 
value of the best alternative technology. An increase in the value 
of the best alternative technology will decrease royalties for each 
complementary invention. An increase in the value of the best 
alternative technology also will increase profit net of royalties 
for technology adopters, for a given profit level. This is the case 
for standard bilateral negotiation.254 This also is the case in the 
more general negotiation framework with multiple patent hold-
ers and multiple technology adopters. 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 228, at 877–80 (discussing the consensus 
method for standards setting, where even “noncontributing firms have power to 
influence what is or isn’t adopted as a standardized solution”). 
 252. Id. at 880 (“The widespread adoption of standards across the mobile 
wireless industry and incredible performance improvements from 2G to 3G to 
4G indicates that the standard-setting process is likely working.”). 
 253. See Farrell et al., supra note 31, at 630–31 (asserting that negotiation 
before an industry standard is chosen is exceedingly rare). 
 254. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 2007 (“The mitigation strategies 
therefore raise the joint profits of the patent holder and the downstream firm 
in bilateral bargaining.”); Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 2138 (present-
ing an equation for royalties under bilateral negotiation); Gilbert, supra note 
21, 46–47 (a sample equation for royalties). 
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Standardization achieved through voluntary standards or-
ganizations increases the value of the best alternative for 
adopters in comparison to previous technology standards. By in-
creasing the value of the best alternative for technology 
adopters, standardization decreases royalties for each of the 
complementary inventions, all other things equal. Standardiza-
tion also increases the profits of patent holders net of royalties. 
The observation that standardization increases the value of 
the best alternative for adopters runs contrary to the concern 
expressed by “SEP holdup.” The problem lies in choosing the ap-
propriate benchmark for negotiation. The benchmark for private 
negotiation should not be chosen by public policy makers. The 
institutionally correct benchmark for negotiation should be 
based on the alternatives available to market participants ra-
ther than hypothetical technologies. The alternatives available 
to market participants reflect existing technologies that satisfy 
new or revised standards and prior standards. 
Standardization by industry consensus is based on techno-
logical change, which adds new technologies to the marketplace. 
New or revised consensus technology standards recognize the 
appearance of additional technologies. Despite a superficial 
reading of the term, standardization does not arbitrarily remove 
potentially valuable technological alternatives. Rather, technol-
ogy standards often serve to recognize and illuminate technolog-
ical change. As noted by the International Standards Organiza-
tion (ISO), “[a]n ISO International Standard represents a global 
consensus on the state of the art in the subject of that stand-
ard.”255 This is distinct from government regulatory standards, 
which can narrow the number of technologies and limit innova-
tion.256 
Standardization through voluntary standards organizations 
increases the number and quality of technological alternatives 
available to adopters. Consensus standards increase technologi-
cal alternatives because they promote invention and innovation. 
 
 255. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS OF STANDARDS 1 (1st ed. 2011), https://www.iso.org/publica-
tion/PUB100288.html. 
 256. See, e.g., Mehreen Khan, The EU Seeks for Force Through a Single 
Standard Phone Charger, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/65a2dd48-4140-11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d (discussing the European Com-
mission’s mobile phone charger standards, which provide an example of govern-
ment standards that have had unintentionally restrictive effects). 
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“[S]tandardization is an essential part of the microeconomic in-
frastructure: it enables innovation and acts as a barrier to unde-
sirable outcomes.”257 Standards organizations develop and re-
vise standards to facilitate application and absorption of new 
technologies. Increasing the number and quality of technologies 
increases the value of the best alternative technology for 
adopters. 
Technology standards increase the value of technological al-
ternatives because they specify performance quality and im-
prove interoperability of technologies, particularly in infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT). The ISO creates 
“document[s] that provid[e] requirements, specifications, guide-
lines or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure 
that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their 
purpose.”258 ISO has published 22,936 international stand-
ards.259 According to the organization, “ISO standards provide 
solutions and achieve benefits for almost all sectors of activity, 
including agriculture, construction, mechanical engineering, 
manufacturing, distribution, transport, medical devices, infor-
mation and communication technologies, the environment, en-
ergy, quality management, conformity assessment and ser-
vices.”260  
Standardization increases the value to adopters from apply-
ing new technologies. An advantage of standardization is reduc-
tion in the costs of coordination.261 Companies do not need to 
 
 257. G. M. PETER SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF STANDARDIZATION: AN UP-
DATE (2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economics-of-stand-
ardisation-update-to-report; see also G. M. PETER SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
STANDARDIZATION (2000), https://sites.google.com/site/gmpswann/home/cv/pol-
icy-reports/economics-of-standards (analyzing the economics of standardization 
prior to 2000). 
 258. ISO Standards, INST. OF ENVTL. SCI. & TECH., 
https://www.iest.org/Standards-RPs/ISO-Standards (last visited Oct. 19, 2020); 
see Standards, ISO, https://www.iso.org/standards.html (last visited Oct. 19, 
2020) (illustrating the ISO’s own description and definition of ISO standards). 
 259. The ISO Story, ISO, https://www.iso.org/the-iso-story.html (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2020). 
 260. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 
255, at 1. 
 261. See Frank A.G. den Butter, et al., The Transaction Costs Perspective on 
Standards as A Source of Trade and Productivity Growth, TINBERGEN INST. 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 07-090/3, at 20 (Nov. 26, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032135 (concluding that standards are important 
means to reduce transaction costs and thus may enhance coordination of pro-
duction processes). 
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negotiate each time to establish technical specifications and in-
teroperability.262 Transaction cost reductions help more compa-
nies adopt standard technologies. Standardization increases the 
value of the best alternative for adopters because standards in-
crease industry knowledge about technologies and provide in-
teroperability that promotes access to multiple technologies.263 
Many technologies can comply with a standard by conforming to 
quality and interoperability requirements. 
Standardization does not provide a mechanism for patent 
holders to “lock in” adopters.264 Instead, standardization makes 
it easier to switch to new technologies because other industry 
participants have compatible technologies.265 By helping to coor-
dinate technical specifications and interoperability, standardi-
zation facilitates adoption of new technologies.266 This decreases 
the costs of adjustment to new technologies and increases the 
value of technological alternatives for adopters.267 
Rather than narrowing industry choices, standardization is 
a process of developing product quality and interoperability 
specifications.268 Standardization makes it easier to provide 
parts, components, and final products that conform to industry 
standards.269 These specifications provide opportunities for en-
try of producers of parts, components, and final products that 
meet technological specifications.270 Standardization reduces 
the transaction costs associated with industry coordination, 
 
 262. See id. at 11 (“When product specifications are standardized and know 
[sic] to trading partners, the bargaining process will cover only the price and 
conditions of delivery.”). 
 263. See DIN GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR STANDARDIZATION, ECONOMIC BENE-
FITS OF STANDARDIZATION 13 (2000), https://www.iec.ch/about/globalreach/aca-
demia/pdf/academia_governments/economic_benefits_standardization.pdf 
(discussing potential competitive advantage through standards in terms of 
knowledge). 
 264. Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 
J. COMP. L. & ECON. 915, 915 (2008). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 946–47. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., DIN, supra note 263, at 14 (“Standards offer a wider choice of 
suppliers with the same degree of quality.”). 
 269. Id. (“The application of standards and participation in standards work 
relevant to the supplier market can therefore enable a company to exert market 
pressure on their suppliers.”). Therefore, under the increased pressure, the sup-
pliers are more likely to supply products that conform to industry standards. 
 270. Id. 
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which also serves to reduce adoption costs. In other words, 
standardization increases the benefits of technology adopters 
without “lock in”. 
Standardization increases the value obtained from the tech-
nology used by adopters and the value of the best alternative 
technology that complies with the standard. Some SEPs may be 
substitutes rather than complements for particular adopters.271 
Also, an adopter may choose to supply only some of the many 
products that comply with a technology standard.272 For exam-
ple, an adopter may choose to produce many varieties of mobile 
phones, each of which involves different combinations of technol-
ogies. A technology adopter may choose among different types of 
products, such as say mobile phones versus tablet computers, 
each of which would involve different combinations of technolo-
gies. This creates alternatives for the technology adopter. 
Adopters may not need to obtain all of the SEPs associated 
with a particular standard to comply with that standard. SEPs 
are declared essential for a standard but a standard potentially 
covers a wide range of products.273 Despite their classification as 
“essential”, not all SEPs are necessary for every product.274 It 
may not be necessary to obtain every SEP declared for a partic-
ular standard for every product. Also, some declared SEPs may 
be substitutes.275 There are many declared SEPs, with one esti-
mate exceeding 200,000.276 There is evidence of over-declaration 
of SEPs.277 
 
 271. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 120, at 156 (mentioning that SEPs can be 
“innovative complements” or “innovative substitutes”). 
 272. For many standards, compliance is voluntary. See, e.g., id. at 94 (“Mem-
bership in SSOs and adoption of technology standards is voluntary for all in-
dustry participants”). Therefore, an adopter is not forced to supply all products 
that comply with a technology standard. 
 273. See id. at 135 (“The technology standard offers . . . interoperability 
across products. Indeed, a technology standard established by an SSO typically 
is a class of technologies rather than a particular technology.”). 
 274. Id. (“[D]eclared essential patents may not be necessary for companies 
to conform to the standard.”). 
 275. Id. at 156 (mentioning that SEPs can be “innovative complements” or 
“innovative substitutes”). 
 276. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND, supra note 124, at 24. Bekkers et al. 
consider a dozen SSOs and find about 4,910 SEP disclosures. Rudi Bekkers et 
al., Disclosure Rules and Declared Essential Patents 49 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Res., Working Paper No. 23627, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23627. 
 277. See Robin Stitzing et al., Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Pa-
tents and Determinants of Essentiality 17 (Sept. 4, 2018) (available online), 
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Standardization increases the profits of adopters in other 
ways besides increasing the number of technological alterna-
tives. New or revised technology standards often represent im-
provements in product performance.278 Technology standards in-
crease demand for innovative products by certifying quality and 
by promoting new product features to consumers.279 Technology 
standards increase producer demand for innovative products by 
improving interoperability and reducing adoption costs.280 Prac-
tically all standard organizations including standards develop-
ment organizations (SDOs) and industry consortia view their 
mission as promoting the adoption of technology standards.281 
Technological change and standardization extend beyond 
the value of the best alternative technologies available to 
adopters. The interaction between innovation and standardiza-
tion increases the profits of adopters and other industry mem-
bers.282 By increasing profits, technology standards increase 
benefits to both patent holders and technology adopters, con-
trary to the “SEP holdup” allegation. Patent holders and tech-
nology adopters benefit from an increase in the size of the pie to 
be divided through negotiation.283 An increase in profits minus 
the returns to the best alternative increases royalties received 
by patent holders and also increases returns to technology 
adopters. 
Technology standards often are prospective, that is, stand-
ardization provides targets and guidance for R&D.284 Standard-
ization and innovation are related activities that interact over 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2951617 (basing the research of the over-declara-
tion of SEPs on 79,257 patents in the ETSI database). 
 278. See Spulber, supra note 120, at 136 (noting that a technology standard 
often represents a goal for which technologies do not exist and improvements in 
the technology in turn will lead to updates to the standard). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 86 (“SSOs also establish IP policies that utilize FRAND commit-
ments in order to encourage participate in standard setting and promote adop-
tion of technology standards.”). 
 282. DIN, supra note 263, at 15 (reaching a conclusion that standardization 
helps reduce costs and increase profits). 
 283. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 120, at 131 (“FRAND licensing is achieved 
by negotiation between those SEP owners and makers of mobile devices and 
network equipment.”). 
 284. Id. at 136. 
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time.285 Technologies generally are developed concurrently or 
even after technology standards.286 The R&D needed to develop 
the new technologies is time consuming, costly, and subject to 
considerable uncertainty.287 Standards incorporate technology 
proposals from industry participants, many of which are en-
gaged in R&D to develop those technologies.288 Standardization 
targets in turn help to guide R&D conducted while standards are 
developed.289 Technologies involved in standardization often 
have not yet been fully developed during the standardization 
process.290 Best alternative technologies often do not exist be-
cause they have not yet been developed during the standardiza-
tion process.291 Standardization both guides and reflects techno-
logical change.292 
Negotiation of patent license agreements cannot occur be-
fore standardization.293 This is because standardization is more 
complicated than choosing from a set of available innovative 
technologies. It would be inaccurate to suppose that the stand-
ardization process simply occurs after innovation.294 Developing 
new technologies and technology standards takes time. Consider 
for example, the development of generations of standards in mo-
bile telecommunication. Beginning with 1G in 1981 and contin-
uing to 5G in 2021, the generations of technologies each repre-
sent about ten years.295 It is predicted that developing the 6G 
 
 285. See id. (noting that a technology standard often represents a goal for 
which technologies do not exist and improvements in the technology in turns 
will lead to updates to the standard). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Spulber, supra note 162, at 810. 
 288. Id. at 794 (“Before, or ex ante, multiple technologies may compete to be 
incorporated into the standard under consideration.”). 
 289. See DIN, supra note 263, at 16 (“Business can reduce the economic risk 
of their R&D activities by participating in standardization.”). 
 290. Spulber, supra note 120, at 99 (“Standardization typically does not in-
volve a choice between a set of fully developed technology alternatives.”). 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Spulber, supra note 162, at 825 (concluding that technology stand-
ards provide important guide and indication of technological change). 
 293. Spulber, supra note 120, at 98 (noticing that this results from IP poli-
cies). 
 294. Stitzing et al., supra note 277, at 12. 
 295. See Azar Taufique et al.,, Planning Wireless Cellular Networks of Fu-
ture: Outlook, Challenges and Opportunities, 5 IEEE ACCESS 4821, 4831 (2017) 
(discussing this hirtory of cellular technology generations); see also Dino Flore, 
Tentative 3GPP Timeline for 5G, 3GPP.ORG (Mar. 17, 2015), 
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mobile telecommunications standards and technologies will take 
another ten years, with a possible introduction after 2030.296 
Standardization takes time because of the difficulties in in-
formation exchange, discussions in technical committees, and 
decision making within standard development organizations 
(SDOs). Standardization is a process of industry consensus 
building by members of standards organizations.297 The mem-
bers of standards organizations include not only inventors and 
innovators, but also suppliers of parts and components and pro-
ducers of products and services.298 The process of establishing 
standards requires extensive discussions because of the time re-
quired to understand potential technologies and the time in-
volved in consensus decision making. Standards organizations 
require declaration of SEPs before the relevant technological 
specifications are incorporated in standards.299 
Some argue for restrictions on injunctions because of the al-
leged effects of “SEP holdup” negotiation.300 Injunctions, how-
ever, are simply a legal mechanism for enforcing IP rights and 
preventing infringement.301 The effects of injunctions on patent 
license agreements are limited because injunctions require court 
 
https://www.3gpp.org/news-events/1674-timeline_5g (showing a 3GPP en-
dorsed tentative time line for standardizing 5G). 
 296. 6G RESEARCH VISIONS 1, KEY DRIVERS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
FOR 6G UBIQUITOUS WIRELESS INTELLIGENCE 6G FLAGSHIP 4 (Matti Latva-aho 
& Kari Leppänen eds., 2019) (“This new wave of technology will accelerate the 
digitalisation of economies and society. Historically, a new mobile ‘generation’ 
appears approximately every ten years, with 6G expected to emerge around 
2030.”). 
 297. See, e.g., Consumers and Standards: Partnership for a Better World, 
ISO, https://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/1_standards.html (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2020) (“An ISO International Standard represents a global con-
sensus on the state of the art in the subject of that standard.”). 
 298. Id. (“[T]he process allows for input and consensus building, first among 
market players and experts at the drafting stages of the standards . . . .”). 
 299. Spulber, supra note 120, at 98. 
 300. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 1993 (“[T]he threat of an 
injunction can dramatically influence the negotiations between a single patent 
owner and an alleged infringer, especially if the patented technology covers one 
component of a complex product.”) 
 301. See Injunctions and Restraining Orders in Patent Infringement Cases, 
JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/patents/infringement/in-
junctions-and-restraining-orders-in-patent-infringement-cases/ (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2020) (“If you can show that the defendant likely infringed on a valid 
patent that you own, you may be able to get an injunction from the judge that 
orders the defendant to stop the infringement. An injunction is not a substitute 
for damages . . . .”). 
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approval.302 The eBay decision placed limitations on injunctions 
by patent holders that have affected subsequent court deci-
sions.303 SSO FRAND commitments already protect the inter-
ests of patent holders and technology adopters in patent license 
negotiation.304 Most SSO FRAND policies do not limit injunc-
tions by patent holders, with the exception of the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).305 
The “SEP holdup” concept extends earlier arguments re-
garding “patent holdup” in patent license negotiation.306 The 
“patent holdup” problem is said to occur if switching costs de-
crease the value of the adopter’s best alternative thus increasing 
royalties.307 This purported problem also suggests that patent 
holders take improper advantage of technology adopters.308 As 
noted previously, the “patent holdup” concept has been highly 
influential.309  
Adopters benefit from competition among substitute tech-
nologies, which increases the value of the best alternative.310 
Firms may incur switching costs when adopting new 
 
 302. Id. (“An injunction is an order by a court . . . .”). 
 303. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see Christo-
pher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 2002 (2015) (analyzing the implica-
tions of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange on subse-
quent patent infringement cases); Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Pa-
tent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s 
Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 145 (2017) (“More than ten years 
after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in eBay v. Mer-
cExchange, the availability of injunctive relief in patent cases remains hotly 
contested.”). 
 304. See Spulber, supra note 120, at 118 (illustrating that patent license 
agreements protect the reasonable expectation of parties in the context of SSO 
FRAND). 
 305. Id. at 125. 
 306. Id. at 133 (mentioning that “‘patent holdup’ . . . may be termed ‘SEP 
holdup’ to distinguish from the basic switching cost story”). 
 307. Id. at 132–33 (analyzing two related public policy concerns that “patent 
holdup” refers to). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 133 (mentioning that the “patent holdup” concept is popular). 
 310. Elhauge, supra note 218, at 537 (commenting on Lemley and Shapiro, 
and observing that “their holdup model does not apply in cases where multiple 
patent-licensees compete downstream. In such cases, competition will likely 
drive royalties toward patent value. Nor does their holdup model apply in cases 
where multiple patent-owners compete upstream. In such cases, royalties will 
tend to be inefficiently low”). 
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technologies.311 Switching costs include organizational adjust-
ment costs, and absorption costs, such as the costs of learning 
about the new technology and learning how to use the new tech-
nology.312 These are related to producer adjustment costs nor-
mally encountered in installing capital equipment or introduc-
ing worker tasks. If a patented technology has high adjustment 
costs, the producer will be more likely to adopt an alternative. 
Conversely, if an alternative technology has high adjustment 
costs, the producer is more likely to adopt a patented technology. 
Some switching costs only come into play if the technology 
adopter already is using the patented technology and must de-
sign around existing technology before adopting an alternative 
technology. Producers routinely incur such switching costs as in-
novations displace existing technologies. 
C. “PATENT THICKETS,” “BLOCKING PATENTS,” AND THE 
“TRAGEDY OF THE ANTI-COMMONS” 
Negotiation of patent license agreements realizes the bene-
fits of increases in the number of patents. Negotiation of patent 
license agreements in a competitive market avoids multiple mar-
ginalization.313 Negotiation of patent license agreements gener-
ates total royalties that are less than what a bundling monopo-
list inventor would charge.314 Bilateral negotiation of patent 
license agreements allows technology adopters and patent hold-
ers to achieve multilateral coordination.315 These advantages of 
negotiation are not affected by the number of patents.316 
The negotiation framework presented here shows that in-
creases in the number of patents increases benefits for technol-
ogy adopters. Increases in the number of patents offer the poten-
tial for technological change and economic growth.317 An 
increase in patents reflects more inventions and innovations 
 
 311. Spulber, supra note 162, at 801. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Spulber, supra note 41, at 61–62. 
 314. See generally id. (discussing the effect negotiations have on a bundled 
monopolist’s price). 
 315. See Spulber, supra note 162, at 800 (discussing the impact of bilateral 
negotiations on adopters and patent holders). 
 316. Spulber, supra note 41 (showing that the number of patents is not a 
factor for calculating the impact of negotiations). 
 317. See Economic Development and Patents, WIPO, 
https://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/economic.html (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2020) (demonstrating that patents promote economic development). 
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rather than dispersion of a given amount of IP. An increase in 
rate of patenting is a positive indicator of the strength of inven-
tion and innovation. Complementary patents, in particular, offer 
the benefits of technological synergies because inventions in-
crease the economic benefits of other inventions.318 Complemen-
tary inventions suggest a virtuous cycle as new inventions in-
crease adopter benefits, and greater adopter benefits provide 
incentives for further invention and innovation.319 
Some researchers and policy makers have expressed con-
cerns that there are just “too many patents.” Not surprisingly, 
public policy recommendations argue for reductions in the num-
ber of patents. These policy concerns are variously referred to as 
“patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and the “Tragedy of the 
Anti-Commons.” It is suggested that patent holders demand 
payment like trolls under a bridge.320 Patent holders are said to 
collect tolls like medieval barons on the Rhine River.321 Advo-
cates describe complementary patents as dense bushes or trees 
that require hacking through or weeds that should be cleared.322 
Ayres and Parchomovsky refer to patents as an “information 
haze” comparable to environmental pollution and depletion of 
ocean fisheries.323 They suggest that the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) increase renewal fees to de-
crease the number of patents or institute quantity regulation of 
the number of the patents combined with tradeable patent 
rights, another way of raising the costs of obtaining a patent.324 
 
 318. Spulber, supra note 120, at 137 (“The combination of complementary 
components often results in complex systems that generate benefits greater 
than can be achieved by separate groups of components.”). 
 319. See, e.g., id. at 82 (“SSOs thus increase the rate of technological change 
because industry participants create complementary inventions and innova-
tions.”). 
 320. Anne Layne-Farrar & Klaus M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Pa-
tents: “Patent Trolls,” Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties, 25 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L. J., 1121, 1121 (2010). 
 321. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: A Concise Introduc-
tion and Lexicon, 76 MOD. L. REV. 6, 9–10 (2013). 
 322. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 120 (describing a patent thicket as 
“a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must 
hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology”); Ayres 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 32, at 865 (“[W]e seek to explore two alternative 
mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets.”). 
 323. Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 32, at 866. 
 324. Id. at 865. 
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Many of the arguments for “patent thickets,” “blocking pa-
tents,” and the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” are based on the 
Cournot model.325 An increase in the number of complementary 
property rights adversely affects market outcomes by intensify-
ing the “Cournot Effect.” Having more complementary patents 
exacerbates the free-rider effect and thus increases total royal-
ties.326 In turn, increases in royalties deter invention because fu-
ture inventors will need to obtain patents to conduct R&D.327 
Also, increases in royalties deter innovation by decreasing adop-
tion of patented technologies.328 
These concerns hinge on the assumptions of the Cournot 
model. As has been emphasized, the Cournot model assumes 
“take-it-or-leave-it” pricing rather than negotiation.329 The 
Cournot model assumes that IP holders have 100% of the market 
power in both markets for invention and downstream product 
markets. The Cournot model assumes that there is 100% pass 
through of royalty costs to downstream product prices. Together, 
these assumptions generate the result that an increase in the 
number of IP holders increases the severity of the “Cournot Ef-
fect.” 
The arguments for “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and 
the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” also are based on transac-
tion costs.330 Inventors and innovators are deterred because they 
 
 325. See, e.g., Charles deGrazia, Jesse Frumkin & Nicholas A. Pairolero, 
Embracing Invention Similarity for the Measurement of Vertically Overlapping 
Claims 1-2 (USPTO ECON. Working Paper, No. 2018-01, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166042 (describing the patent thicket prob-
lem as being based on the “Cournot complements problem”); Shapiro, supra note 
32, at 119 (defining a patent thicket as “an overlapping set of patent rights re-
quiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from 
multiple patentees”). 
 326. deGrazia, Frumkin, & Pairolero, supra note 325, at 1–2. 
 327. Id. (“We propose a new measure of vertically overlapping claims that 
incorporates invention similarity to more precisely identify inventive overlap. 
The measure defined in this paper will enable more accurate measurement, and 
allow for novel economic research on technological complexity, fragmentation in 
intellectual property, and patent thickets within and across all patent jurisdic-
tions.”). 
 328. Spulber, supra note 120, at 153. 
 329. Spulber, supra note 27, at 138. 
 330. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innova-
tion? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 701 (1998) 
(“An anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely to endure than in 
other areas of intellectual property because of the high transaction costs of 
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must negotiate with too many patent holders. The transaction 
cost argument, however, is inconsistent with the excessive roy-
alty argument. The transaction cost argument is based on the 
costs of negotiation whereas the excessive royalty argument is 
based on the absence of negotiation, which underpins the 
“Cournot Effect.” 
The view that there are “too many patents” is fundamen-
tally flawed, even within its own framework. First, the “too 
many patents” view, whether based on royalty effects or trans-
action costs, fails to account for the benefits of patented technol-
ogies.331 In this view, patented technologies offer no profits for 
technology adopters and no benefits for their customers. The en-
try of inventors into the marketplace imposes costs without ben-
efits.332 As a consequence, patents appear to be a nuisance that 
imposes royalty costs and transaction costs on society. Consider-
ation of the effects of the number of patents on efficiency should 
also include the economic benefits of patented technologies. 
Second, the “too many patents” view ignores the need for in-
centives that would motivate inventors and innovators. Inven-
tion and innovation require costly capital investment, human 
capital, and creativity.333 In the “too many patents” view, tech-
nological change arrives like a windfall, without the need for in-
ventive or innovative effort. The economic and legal analysis ig-
nores the contribution of royalties as returns to inventors and 
innovators. The number of patents is seen as excessive because 
royalties are a cost to society without any corresponding benefit. 
Third, the “too many patents” view does not consider the 
contributions of the patent system itself to economic efficiency. 
Patents provide part of the system of IP rights that allows 
 
bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and cognitive biases of re-
searchers.”). 
 331. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see also, Mark 
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.R. 1031, 
1055 (2005) (“Intellectual property, then, is not a response to allocative distor-
tions resulting from scarcity, as real property law is. Rather, it is a conscious 
decision to create scarcity in a type of good in which it is ordinarily absent in 
order to artificially boost the economic returns to innovation.”). 
 332. See, e.g., Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 34, at 5–10. 
 333. For a general discussion of this point, see Stephen Haber, Patents and 
the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV 811, 834 (2016) (“[T]wo very dif-
ferent bodies of scholarship . . . yield the same answer: there is a causal rela-
tionship between strong patents and innovation.”). 
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markets for IP to form.334 Markets offer efficiencies in the allo-
cation of technologies. Patents decrease transaction costs of tech-
nology transfer by standardizing descriptions of inventions and 
by offering certification of inventions as useful, novel, and non-
obvious. Patents support all kinds of related transactions, in-
cluding cross-licensing and financing based on patents as collat-
eral assets. 
 Negotiation of patent license agreements addresses the in-
teraction of complementary patent license agreements. There is 
considerable evidence that there is widespread usage of patent 
license agreements.335 A number of institutional solutions ad-
dress transactions costs and coordination with complementary 
patents. Many companies offer licenses for patent portfolios, 
which provide transaction cost efficiencies in comparison with 
licensing individual patents.336 Patent license agreements im-
prove coordination when there are complementary inventions.337 
Patents facilitate the entry of innovative specialist firms.338 In-
termediaries such as patent aggregators and patent pools also 
address transaction costs in comparison with licensing individ-
ual patents, as will be discussed further in the next section. 
A number of other market institutions address transaction 
costs with complementary patents. Cockburn et al. find mixed 
effects of patent ownership diffusion on innovation, with firms 
adjusting their R&D and in-licensing decisions.339 Graff et al. 
 
 334. See generally Spulber, supra note 50 (asserting, for instance, that such 
a system “increases transaction efficiencies”). 
 335. See Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Con-
tracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON.103, 103 (2000) (“Licensing is . . . one of the most com-
monly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.”); Spulber, supra note 120, 
at 134. 
 336. Elyse Dorsey, Building Patent Portfolios to Facilitate Cross-Licensing 
Agreements: Implications for Merger Efficiency Analysis, 15 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 125, 135 (2013) (“[P]ortfolios do play an important role in both 
reducing litigation and transactions costs.”). 
 337. ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 171 (2001); Ashish Arora & Robert P. 
Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent 
Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licens-
ing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293 (2006). 
 338. Damien Geradin et al., Elves or Trolls? The Role of Nonpracticing Pa-
tent Owners in the Innovation Economy, 21 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 73, 78 
(2011). 
 339. Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patent Thickets, Licensing and Innovative Per-
formance, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 899, 901 (2010) (providing “the first 
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find that biotechnology firms use combinations of R&D and mer-
ger and acquisition (M&A) strategies.340 Ziedonis finds evidence 
that firms address transaction costs by acquiring patents.341 
Galasso & Schankerman suggest that having more complemen-
tary patents in an industry may induce more rapid settlement 
in patent disputes.342 The court in Acorda Therapeutics, which 
addresses “blocking patents,” observed that companies facing 
patent expiration will pursue strategies such as “product-line ex-
tension (new formulations, new combinations), new indications, 
or a follow-on product.”343 
There is mixed empirical support for the dire predictions of 
“patent thickets” and “blocking patents.” Empirical analyses of 
“patent thickets” offer minimal evidence of economic ineffi-
ciency. Hall et al. conduct an extensive survey that documents 
growth in the number of patents in the US and UK, but observed 
that “[o]ur report reveals a lack of empirical evidence on the 
 
direct evidence of a negative relationship between the fragmentation of up-
stream IP rights and the innovative performance of in-licensing firms . . . a pro-
vocative positive relationship between fragmentation and innovative perfor-
mance among firms that do not in-license . . . [and] suggestive evidence that the 
effects of patent thickets may depend on the size of a firm’s own patent portfo-
lio”). 
 340. Gregory D. Graff et al., Agricultural Biotechnology’s Complementary In-
tellectual Assets, 85 REV. ECON. STAT. 349, 362 (2003) (“These findings support 
the hypothesis that the industry’s recent restructuring is causally driven by the 
attempt of firms to achieve coordination between complementary intellectual 
assets in the face of the difficulties or transaction costs of accessing these assets 
externally.”). 
 341. Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for 
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804, 
817 (“I find that firms acquire patents more aggressively than otherwise pre-
dicted when markets for technological inputs are highly fragmented (i.e., when 
rights to a firm’s complementary patents are widely distributed among outside 
parties).”). 
 342. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Thickets, Courts, and 
the Market for Innovation, 41 RAND J. ECON. 472, 501 (2010) (“We develop a 
model of patent litigation which predicts that settlement agreements are 
reached more quickly in the presence of fragmented patent rights and when 
there is less uncertainty about court outcomes, as was the case after the intro-
duction of the ‘pro-patent’ appellate court.”); see also Doug Lichtman, Patent 
Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 292, 2006). 
 343. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1341 
n.18 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 111 (2019) (citing Chie Hoon Song 
& Jeung-Whan Han, Patent Cliff and Strategic Switch: Exploring Strategic De-
sign Possibilities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 SPRINGERPLUS 692, 698–99 
(2016)). 
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effect of thickets on firm behavior, both in terms of performance 
and innovative activity.”344 Their survey finds that the literature 
has raised concerns about the social welfare effects of “patent 
thickets.”345 However “there is so far very little evidence on the 
effects patent thickets have on firm entry.”346 Blind et al. suggest 
various strategic motives for patenting by firms, but “the clear 
distinction between ‘discrete’ and ‘complex’ industries in the 
structure of the patent motives cannot be observed in our sam-
ple.”347 Von Graevenitz et al. explain that the growth of patent 
applications may be based on technological opportunities and 
complexity.348 
There is little evidence for the “Tragedy of the Anti-Com-
mons” in biomedical technology.349 For example, some discus-
sions of the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” rely on informal an-
ecdotes.350 Caulfield et al. find that there is more anecdote than 
evidence in biotechnology: 
The combination of a lack of empirical evidence of problems and a mis-
match between the problems and proposed solutions may explain why 
there has been little actual policy change. In addition, our review of the 
lively policy debate and the limited empirical support for the claims 
that are driving that debate suggest that policy makers may be re-
sponding more to a high-profile anecdote or arguments with high face 
validity than they are to systematic data on the issues.351 
 
 344. BRONWYN HALL ET AL., A STUDY OF PATENT THICKETS 51 (2012). 
 345. Id. at 52. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from Germany, 
35 RES. POL’Y 655, 671 (2006); see also Knut Blind et al., The Influence of Stra-
tegic Patenting on Companies’ Patent Portfolios, 38 RES. POL’Y 428 (2009). 
 348. Von Graevenitz et al., Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets: The 
Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 521 
(2013). 
 349. Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticom-
mons?, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54, 56. 
 350. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621–88 (1998) (devel-
oping the theory of anticommons property through the example of post-1990 
Moscow); id. at 700(“When owners have conflicting goals and each can deploy 
its rights to block the strategies of the others, they may not be able to reach an 
agreement that leaves enough private value for downstream developers to bring 
products to the market.”); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW 
TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS 
LIVES 49–78 (2008) (providing a series of narratives to anticommons theory in 
the biomedical field). 
 351. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Hu-
man Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091, 1094 (2006). 
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According to Buckley, the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” 
may simply be a myth in the biotechnology industry.352 Barnett 
observes that the lack of evidence for the “Tragedy of the Anti-
commons” suggests that this concern should not be used as a 
guide for public policy: 
[T]he paucity of empirical evidence to support the AC [anti-commons] 
thesis reduces confidence in proposals to weaken IP rights in order to 
protect the market from AC effects. Conversely, the abundance of em-
pirical evidence for markets’ self-corrective capacities raises confidence 
that robust IP protection carries little threat of deadlock.353 
Barnett finds little evidence of persistent effects of the number 
of patents on markets for IP.354 
 
D. “REGULATORY PATENT POOLS” 
Negotiation of patent license agreements in competitive 
markets generally is sufficient to achieve economic efficiency 
with complementary inventions. As emphasized here, negotia-
tion allows patent holders and technology adopters to form tai-
lored patent license agreements. This helps explain why many 
industries favor negotiation over patent pools. About ninety per-
cent of SEPs are licensed through negotiation rather than 
through patent pools.355 
Patent pools that allow patent holders and technology 
adopters the option of negotiating individual licenses generate 
royalties that are comparable to market negotiation.356 This sug-
gests that antitrust agencies should continue their policy of 
 
 352. TED BUCKLEY, THE MYTH OF THE ANTICOMMONS (2007). 
 353. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited, 29 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 127, 133 (2015). 
 354. Id. (“Viewed as a whole, the accumulated body of evidence provides lit-
tle ground to believe that AC effects typically persist in IP-intensive markets or 
cause any significant adverse effect to innovation.”). 
 355. Tim Pohlmann & Knut Blind, IPlytics Landscaping Study on Standard 
Essential Patents (SEPs) in Europe, at 36 (Dec. 12, 2016), https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/docsroom/documents/20741/attachments/1/translations/en/rendi-
tions/native (“91% of the worldwide declared SEPs are licensed individually ra-
ther than through a patent pool.”). 
 356. See Lerner & Tirole, supra note 31 (discussing a related point in the 
context of Cournot and Bertrand pricing); see also Josh Lerner, Marcin Stro-
jwas, & Jean Tirole, The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing 
Rules, 38 RAND J. ECON. 610, 610 (2007) (predicting that “pools consisting of 
complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in inde-
pendent licensing”). 
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neutrality with regards to patent pools and negotiated patent li-
cense agreements. 
Some policy makers recommend “regulatory patent pools” to 
address complementary inventions and technology standards. 
For example, the European Commission states that “[t]echnol-
ogy pools can also produce pro-competitive effects, in particular 
by reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumula-
tive royalties to avoid double marginalization.”357 Although pa-
tent pools may require complementary inventions, this does not 
mean that complementary inventions call for “regulatory patent 
pools.” 
The antitrust policy recommendation that regulatory au-
thorities should encourage patent pools is based on applications 
of the Cournot model. According to the “Cournot Effect,” total 
per unit royalties chosen by holders of complementary patents 
are greater than those chosen by a bundling monopolist.358 Ap-
plication of the Cournot model assumes that patent pools choose 
running royalties that are constant per unit of output and corre-
spond to those of a bundling monopolist. The “Cournot Effect” 
drives the prediction that a patent pool would lower total royal-
ties with complementary inventions.359 
Any antitrust policy toward patent pools based on the 
“Cournot Effect” is misguided for a number of important reasons. 
The main problem with the Cournot model approach is that it 
characterizes patent pools as bundling monopolists.360 The 
Cournot model approach to patent pools again incorrectly as-
sumes 100% cost pass-through in the downstream market, 
which does not describe most markets in practice. The Cournot 
model approach to patent pools further assumes that the patent 
pool has 100% market power not only in the market for 
 
 357. Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 37, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriS-
erv.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0002:0042:EN:PDF. 
 358. See Spulber, supra note 27, at 138 (“[M]onopolists supplying comple-
mentary inputs to competitive downstream producers will choose prices whose 
total is greater than what a monopolist would charge for a bundle of those in-
puts.”). 
 359. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 123 (“Cournot’s theory of comple-
ments cast in terms of blocking patents . . . gives strong support for businesses 
to adopt, and for competition authorities to welcome, either cross licensees, 
package licenses, or patent pools to clear such blocking positions.”). 
 360. See Spulber, supra note 27 (discussing the Cournot model). 
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inventions but also in the downstream product market. The 
Cournot model approach to patent pools further requires that 
royalties are constant charges per unit of output, which guaran-
ties price distortions downstream when combined with the mo-
nopoly assumptions. Using these assumptions, the Cournot 
model predicts that a patent pool would choose a total royalty 
such that the downstream output price equals the textbook mo-
nopoly price per unit of output. This is the other side of the 
“Cournot Effect”, which states that patent holders choose royal-
ties greater than the bundling monopoly.361 
The Cournot model approach mischaracterizes the bundling 
monopoly patent holder. The bundling monopoly does not face 
100% cost pass-through because downstream producers have up-
ward sloping supply curves. As the previous discussion shows, 
when the bundling monopoly is a price taker in the downstream 
market, the bundling monopoly has an incentive to choose a zero 
per unit royalty. The bundling monopoly will choose royalties 
that are contingent on downstream market prices. Then, royal-
ties will be a share of the profits of downstream producers. 
As noted previously, it is also inaccurate to characterize pa-
tent pools as bundling monopolists. In practice, patent pools es-
tablish some running royalties that are constant per unit of out-
put.362 These royalties, however, are subject to adjustments that 
depart from constant running royalties. The royalties can be a 
schedule of running royalties where the royalty rate is lower for 
higher numbers of units sold.363 Some of these royalties are 
waived for producers with small outputs. Royalties are subject 
to firm-level caps that limit total royalties. In addition, the pa-
tent pool reduces running royalties over time. For example, 
MPEG LA’s running royalty for MPEG-2 Decoders and Encoders 
declined steadily: $4.00 per unit before January 1, 2002, $2.00 
from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2015, $0.50 from 
January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2017, and $0.35 starting 
 
 361. Id. at 138 (“[E]ach input monopolist chooses its price without taking 
into account the effect of its price on the demand for all of the complementary 
inputs.”). 
 362. See, e.g., MPEG-2 License Terms Summary, MPEG LA, 
https://www.mpegla.com/wp-content/uploads/m2web-RoyaltySummary.pdf 
(displaying the royalty schedules of licensing agreements). 
 363. See, e.g., License Fees, VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/li-
censing/802-11/802-11-license-fees/ (displaying the royalty schedule for the IEE 
standard). 
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January 1, 2018.364 The level of these running royalties does not 
appear consistent with the unlimited monopoly power suggested 
by the Cournot model. 
The purpose of patent pools is to provide intermediation be-
tween patent holders and technology adopters. Patent pools and 
other intermediary organizations offer transaction cost sav-
ings.365 As I discuss elsewhere, patent pools and other interme-
diaries provide transaction cost savings by designing “Intellec-
tual Contracts” (ICs) and coordinating contracting.366 Patent 
pools and other intermediaries offer market platforms for ICs 
that provide the convenience of standardization and one-stop 
shopping.367 Merges emphasizes that patent pools offer transac-
tion costs savings of collective rights organizations particularly 
with high volume licensing.368 Merges & Mattioli empirically de-
termine transaction cost savings from patent pools.369 Patent 
pools also incur transaction costs of formation and costs of deter-
mining whether patents are essential to technology stand-
ards.370 
These observations suggest that antitrust policy should not 
promote patent pools as a mechanism for regulating royalties. 
The courts have not viewed patent pools as a means of regulating 
royalties with complementary inventions. A century of litigation 
involving patent pools shows that competitive effects related to 
complements have not played an important role.371 
 
 364. MPEG-2 License Terms Summary, supra note 362. 
 365. den Butter et al., supra note 261 at 20. 
 366. See Spulber, supra note 44. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295–
96 (1996). 
 369. See Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Ben-
efits of Patent Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 281 (2017) (expressing concerns about 
welfare effects of patent pools); see also Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the 
Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. REG. 359 (1999) (arguing that the Department 
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission should not adopt a per se rule of 
legality for the pooling of blocking patents). 
 370. Contreras, supra note 21, at 76 (“[P]atent pool licensing comes at a 
steep cost. Most importantly, patent pools typically involve substantial up-front 
expenses (primarily legal and patent analysis costs) associated with their for-
mation . . . [P]atent pools must ensure, with a high degree of certainty, that all 
patents placed in the pool are essential.”). 
 371. Richard J. Gilbert, Anti-Trust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evo-
lution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 13 (“Patents that are one-way or two-way 
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The Antitrust Guidelines identify a number of economic 
benefits of patent pools and cross-licensing of IP: 
These arrangements may provide procompetitive benefits by integrat-
ing complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing 
blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. By pro-
moting the dissemination of technology, cross-licensing and pooling ar-
rangements are often procompetitive.372 
Patent pools thus offer transaction efficiencies and facilitate 
technology adoption rather than reducing royalties. 
Patent pools generally offer standardized contracts with 
take-it-or-leave-it provisions and royalty rates. Consider for ex-
ample the MPEG LA patent pool, which might best be described 
as a patent supermarket consisting of multiple patent pools. 
MPEG LA refers to itself as “the world’s leading packager and 
provider of one-stop licenses for standards and other technology 
platforms.”373 MPEG LA offers patent portfolio licenses related 
to the IEEE 1394 high speed transfer digital interface, MPEG-2 
video and systems coding standards, MPEG-4 (Part 2) Visual pa-
tents, VC-1 digital video coding standard, MVC digital video cod-
ing standard, and the digital terrestrial television standard, Dy-
namic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH), display ports, 
high-efficiency video coding (HEVC), enhanced voice services, 
and electric vehicle charging.374 MPEG continues to develop new 
patent pools such as the biotechnology CRISPR-Cas9 Joint Li-
censing Platform.375 
MPEG LA connects hundreds of patent holders with more 
than 6000 licensees and involves thousands of patents.376 MPEG 
LA emphasizes the avoidance of transaction costs and litigation 
costs: 
By assisting users with implementation of their technology choices, 
MPEG LA offers licensing solutions that provide access to fundamental 
intellectual property, freedom to operate, reduced litigation risk and 
predictability in the business planning process. In turn, this enables 
inventors, research institutions and other technology owners to 
 
blocking are complementary, in the sense that an increase in the price of one 
patent (or a reduction in its availability) reduces the value of the other patent.”). 
 372. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 30. 
 373. MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/. 
 374. Current Programs, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/programs/. 
 375. Programs in Development, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/pro-
grams-in-development/. 
 376. MPEG LA, supra note 373. 
2020] ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD PATENT LICENSING 159 
 
monetize and speed market adoption of their assets to a worldwide 
market while substantially reducing the cost of licensing.377 
The MPEG LA patent pool emphasizes that it offers an al-
ternative to negotiation: 
To resolve uncertainty and conflict in the use of MPEG-2 intellectual 
property, as a convenience to users, the licensing model pioneered and 
employed by MPEG LA revolutionized intellectual property rights 
management by enabling multiple MPEG-2 users to acquire essential 
patent rights from multiple patent holders in a single transaction as 
an alternative to negotiating separate licenses.378 
Via Licensing, a subsidiary of Dolby Industries, acts as a pa-
tent pool.379 The Via patent pool includes various audio patent 
licenses: Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), MPEG-4 SLS, and 
MPEG Surround.380 The VIA patent pool also includes wireless 
patent licenses: Multi-Generational (MG) Wireless Program, 
Connected Motor Vehicles, Mobile Devices & General Products, 
LTE, WCDMA, and IEEE 802.11.381 SISVEL also operates mul-
tiple licensing programs in wireless communications, digital 
video and display technology, audio and video coding and decod-
ing, broadband, and localization.382 
V. CONCLUSION 
Negotiation of patent license agreements in competitive 
markets provides coordination and economic efficiency. Negotia-
tion avoids multiple marginalizations and allows royalties to be 
contingent on market outcomes. Negotiation helps realize bene-
fits from increases in the number of patents that improve inven-
tion and innovation. This counters the view that there are “too 
many patents.” Negotiation also helps industries obtain the ben-
efits of standardization, which increases the returns to adopting 
technologies and the value of the best alternative technologies. 
Public policy makers should continue to carefully consider 
the institutional features of the market for IP licensing. Pro-
posed policies that discourage negotiation of patent license con-
tracts in competitive markets appear designed to decrease pa-
tent license royalties and reduce the returns to invention. 
 
 377. Id. 
 378. About, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/about/. 
 379. About, VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/about/. 
 380. Innovation, VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/innovation/. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Licensing Programs, SISVEL, https://www.sisvel.com/licensing-pro-
grams/background. 
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Antitrust policies that promote the interests of technology 
adopters over patent holders would be consistent with rent-seek-
ing.383 If total royalties are too low, revenues from SEPs will dis-
courage inventors’ investment in R&D and diminish the quality 
of the new technology. This will reduce the rate of technological 
change and decrease dynamic efficiency. Some have observed di-
minished incentives to invent, including “lower research inten-
sity,” the “creativity crisis,” the “end of low-hanging fruit,” and 
the “techcrunch.”384 
The negotiation framework presented here reverses predic-
tions based on the Cournot model. Antitrust policies based on 
the “Cournot Effect” would weaken protections for IP and dimin-
ish incentives for invention, innovation, and standardization. 
There is little empirical or conceptual support for antitrust poli-
cies driven by the “Cournot Effect”: “royalty stacking,” “SEP 
holdup,” “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and the “Tragedy 
of the Anticommons.” Antitrust policy should not encourage 
“regulatory patent pools” as a means of reducing royalties. Anti-
trust policy should view patent pools as a means of mitigating 
transaction costs under some market conditions. 
The Antitrust Guidelines recognize that patent license ne-
gotiation with complementary inventions enhances competition. 
The Antitrust Guidelines reflect the economic performance of 
markets for patent license agreements. Most patent licensing 
outside of patent pools involves negotiation. Patent licensing 
contracts outside of patent pools typically involve contingencies 
that reflect prices, revenues, or profit. The market power of in-
ventors in markets for IP and in product markets is significantly 
constrained by competition from substitute technologies, 
 
 383. For information on rent-seeking, see Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs 
of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne O. Krueger, 
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(1974); Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575 (1982); GOR-
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 384. See Richard Florida, America’s Looming Creativity Crisis, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Oct. 2004, https://hbr.org/2004/10/americas-looming-creativity-crisis; TY-
LER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION: HOW AMERICA ATE ALL THE LOW-HANG-
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TER (2011); Mark R. Anderson, The Big Shift: The End Of The Era Of Great 
Invention, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cio-
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Jones, The Future of US Economic Growth, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 44 (2014); Erik 
Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee & Michael Spence, Labor, Capital, and Ideas in 
the Power Law Economy, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 44 (2014). 
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complementary component suppliers, output producers, distrib-
utors, and retailers. Royalties in practice are a small fraction of 
revenues in such industries as mobile telecommunications, 
where technology standards and SEPs play important roles. A 
better understanding of patent license negotiation helps address 
antitrust concerns regarding innovation and standardization. 
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